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In this paper we present historical evidence and a theoretical analysis of the origins of political
stability and instability in Colombia for the period 1850-1950, and their relationship to political,
particularly electoral, institutions. We show that the driving force behind institutional change over
this  period,  specifically  the  move  to  proportional  representation  (PR),  was  the  desire  of  the
Conservative and Liberal parties to come up with a way of credibly dividing power to avoid civil war
and conflict, a force intensified by the brutal conflict of the War of a Thousand days between 1899
and 1902. The problem with majoritarian electoral institutions was that they did not allocate power
in a way which matched the support of the parties in the population, thus encouraging conflict. The
strategic advantage of PR was that it avoided such under-representation. The parties however could
not initially move to PR because it was not `fraud proof' so instead, in 1905, adopted the `incomplete
vote' which simply allocated 2/3 of the legislative seats to the winning party and 1/3 to the loser. This
formula brought peace. The switch to PR arose when the Liberals became confident that they could
solve problems of fraud. But it only happened because they were able to exploit a division within
the Conservatives.  The switch also possibly reflected a concern with the rising support for socialism
and the desire to divide power more broadly. Our findings shed new light on the origins of electoral
systems and the nature of political conflict and its resolution.
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jrobinson@gov.harvard.eduThe complete exclusion of one party is a big mistake
Rafael Nu~ nez (1885)1
The Liberal Party is tamed [...] It lacks energy for political struggle,
and is satis￿ed with its portion of the spoils and its condition of minority
force.
Alfonso L￿ opez Pumarejo (1928)2
1 Introduction
Colombia has not always been a violent country. In fact, for the entire ￿rst half of the 20th
century Colombia was one of the most peaceful countries in Latin America, standing out in
the region as an exotic exemplar of a highly stable and competitive bipartisan democracy.
When faced with the critical test for political stability in that epoch, which occurred
when the continent was hit by the Great Depression in 1930, Colombia was the only big
country in South America in which military interventions were not even considered. While
an armed coup interrupted Argentina’s until then steady path to democracy, and Getulio
Vargas installed the ￿rst modern dictatorship in Brazil, Colombia celebrated elections as
scheduled|moreover, the party in government, the Conservatives, lost the contest, did
not make any move to cling to power, and calmly transferred it to the opposition.
However, Colombia was not born peaceful. That half a century of peaceful political
existence was itself a major novelty in Colombian history. Colombia’s 19th century was
politically chaotic even by Hispanic American standards: the record includes nine national
civil wars, dozens of local revolts, mutinies and pronunciamientos, material destruction
equivalent to several years of economic output, and at least 250,000 deaths due to political
violence.
1La reforma pol￿ ￿tica en Colombia (Bogot￿ a: Banco Popular, 1972), 122.
2Obras selectas (Bogot￿ a: C￿ amara de Representantes, 1979), I: 58.
1How did Colombia make the transition from political chaos to political order? What
were the causes of con￿ict before the turn of the century and what were the bases of
internal peace after it? The emergence of order in Colombia is temporally correlated with
a transformation in the political institutions shaping inter-party relations: internal paci-
￿cation was concomitant with the introduction of special mechanisms for power-sharing
between Liberals and Conservatives, Colombia’s two dominant political forces. The cen-
tral thesis of this paper is that the correlation between the emergence of order and the
introduction of power-sharing institutions is not coincidental, but causal. Before 1905,
institutions favoring power monopolization by a single party forced the opposition into
revolutionary tactics and the government into violent repression, whereas starting in 1905
the emergence of institutions insuring both parties a share of political power roughly
proportional to its electoral force allowed for a peaceful interaction between government
and opposition. From the standpoint of power-sharing mechanisms, the key institutional
change was the replacement in 1905 of majoritarian rule by the incomplete vote, a spe-
cial kind of electoral system. Colombia in turn switched from the incomplete vote to
proportional representation in 1929.
The emergence of political order in Colombia cannot be explained only by the in-
troduction of power-sharing institutions. And power sharing institutions do not reduce
themselves to the incomplete vote or proportional representation. Other causes of order
and other mechanisms for power-sharing certainly exist. Nevertheless, power sharing was
the main cause for the emergence of internal peace, and electoral rules were the only viable
form of power-sharing in the Colombian context around the turn of the century.
This paper develops in six sections. The next section brie￿y reviews the transition from
chaos to order, highlighting essential patterns of inter-party relations in post-independent
Colombia. The third section o￿ers a brief account of electoral rules, underlining di￿er-
ences between forms of representation that are necessary to understand what was at stake
in the Colombian switch from one set of rules to the other. The fourth section provides an
overview of Colombia’s transition to proportional representation. It presents a compara-
tive perspective of the two changes that marked the transition|the introduction of the
incomplete vote in 1905 and of the quotient rule in 1929. Sections ￿ve and six present a
2detailed case study of the antecedents and dynamics of each piece of institutional reform.
Section seven draws conclusions about political con￿ict, power sharing and representation
in post-independent Colombia, placing our argument in relation to competing accounts
in political science, as well as in Colombian historiography.
2 From Chaos to Order: Changing and Enduring Po-
litical Patterns
Standard periodization divides Colombian political history between 1860 and 1930 into
two blocks of time, known as Olimpo Radical (usually translated as the ‘Radical Olympus’
after Mount Olympus - where the Gods lived!) and Hegemon￿ ￿a Conservadora (Conserva-
tive hegemony), each of which is characterized by the dominance of one of the two parties
and a di￿erent set of policies. During the Olimpo Radical, from 1860 to the early 1880s,
the Liberals were in power. It was a period of frantic institutional reform, designed by the
\Radical" faction of the party to eradicate Colombia’s heavy colonial heritage. Promi-
nent among these reforms were the most extreme version of federalism ever known in
the Americas (allowing provincial armies and banning central intervention in inter-state
con￿icts), a frontal attack to the institutional and cultural power of the Church (massive
expropriations of wealth, removal from education, and expulsion of the Jesuit order), and
a number of free-market policies. The intended and unintended consequences of Radical
Liberal reforms|especially the hostility of ample sectors in a deeply Catholic population
and the increasing inability of the central government to stop centrifugal forces|provoked
the Conservative reaction.
After a failed revolt in 1876-77, Conservatives formed a coalition with dissident Lib-
erals, headed by \Independent" Rafael N￿ u~ nez, that managed to displace Radical Liberals
from power in the early 1880s. The Hegemon￿ ￿a Conservadora, sometimes also referred to
as Rep￿ ublica Conservadora, was inaugurated in 1885 after N￿ u~ nez’s government crushed
a revolution by Radical Liberals attempting to regain power. Conservative Hegemony
lasted until 1930. During the subperiod known as La Regeneraci￿ on (-1900), almost every
component of the Radical experiment was reversed: power was recentralized, states lost
3their political autonomy, the authority of the president was reinforced and granted ex-
traordinary powers, and the political, economic, and cultural position of the church was
restored. Less spectacular were reversals in economic policy, which nevertheless included
a signi￿cant increase in tari￿s and new faculties by the government to intervene in the
economy, especially the supply of money.
From another perspective, based not on party or policy distinctions, but on levels
and kinds of political con￿ict, a di￿erent periodization for the 1850-1950 century can be
drawn. The turning point for that periodization occurs around 1905, dividing the period
into two blocks of time, the ￿rst marked by interparty warfare and the second one de￿ned
by peaceful power-sharing. This of course implies a subdivision of the Conservative Hege-
mony, viewed as a single period in the conventional periodization. In fact, if \hegemony"
is de￿ned in the technical sense of rule by one sector in society with the consent of the
subordinate groups, only the second half of the Conservative Republic can be properly
considered hegemonic. Before 1902 Conservative rule su￿ered quasi-permanent contesta-
tion by the Liberal opposition, which twice exploded into open military clashes|hardly
a consensual government.
Parties were the main architects of the emergence of political order after 1905. But
they had also been the main forces responsible for political chaos and material destruction
before that date. Up until the beginning of the 20th century, both Liberals and Conserva-
tives were partly electoral and partly military organizations, with proportions ￿uctuating
over time. Military superiority was the key condition to access and keep government
power. Although from 1860 to 1900 the vast majority of government changes followed
constitutional prescriptions, the only two transfers of power from one party to the other
occurred via military force (Mosquera’s takeover in 1861, and N￿ u~ nez repression of Radi-
cals in 1885). Before 1905, then, party alternation in power was a rare phenomenon, and
always a violent one.
Warfare was a pattern of inter-party relations, and as such it was a broader phenom-
enon than the two episodes of violent takeover by the opposition. It also included several
failed revolutions, for instance, the 1876-77 war under the Radical Liberal government,
and the 1895 war and the Thousand Days’ War (1899-1902) under La Regeneraci￿ on. Fur-
4thermore, as revealed during discrete periods of open war, party warfare also comprised
continuing activities related to the preparation for repression by the government, and the
organization of revolution by the opposition. When Radical Liberals were in power, for
instance, private armies became a frequent phenomenon, whereas under La Regeneraci￿ on
a series of \diplomatic missions" to neighboring countries were dispatched by the Liberal
party in order to collect weapons for the revolutionary arsenal.
The disappearance of warfare as a pattern of inter-party relations de￿nes the passage
from chaos to order. On the other hand, a pattern of party politics that persisted from one
period to the other was the recurrence of internal divisions within parties, and the strategic
utilization of splits by the rival. Faced with the division of the party in government into
an o￿cial and a dissident faction, the opposition used to attempt a coalition with the
dissident faction in order to displace the o￿cial faction from government. Instances of this
pattern include the already mentioned alliance of the Independent or Nu~ nista faction of the
Liberal party with the Conservatives in the early 1880s, ￿irtations throughout the 1890s
between Liberalism and a moderate Conservative faction opposed to La Regeneraci￿ on’s
policies, the \Republican Union" that won the presidential election of 1910, which was
formed by factions from both parties that had opposed president Rafael Reyes (1905-09),
and the election of Conservative Jos￿ e Vicente Concha for president in 1914, which counted
on the support of the Liberal faction that had been left out of the Republican Union.
A permanent feature of Colombian politics, bi-partisan alliances, however, changed from
common military fronts to peaceful electoral coalitions in concomitance with the transition
from chaos to order around 1905.
The main hypothesis of this paper is that the transition from chaos to order in Colom-
bia, which involved the replacement of military fronts by electoral coalitions as the typical
pattern of inter-party relations, was caused by a change of electoral system.
3 What are electoral systems?
Electoral systems are rules that convert popular votes into seats in legislatures|they
translate electoral support for a party into institutional power. Electoral rules are usually
5classi￿ed by means of two polar types: proportional versus majoritarian representation.
A perfectly proportional rule (PR) would assign a party a weight in Congress, measured
in terms of the portion of seats under its control, that is exactly the same as the support
it has among the electorate, measured as percentage of total votes received. Under perfect
proportionality, for instance, a party that is voted for by 32% of the electorate would get
32% of the seats in Congress. On the other hand, the majoritarian extreme assigns all
seats in Congress to the party that has earned the largest amount of votes, no matter
whether it became the winner by getting 75% of the votes, 51% or 32%. Majoritarian
systems, thus, introduce a distortion between level of popular support and institutional
power: for the winner of the electoral contest, they amplify in Congress its popular power,
and they weaken (or even nullify) that of the rest of the parties.
In practice, extreme forms of proportional or majoritarian representation do not exist.
PR, for instance, is usually combined with the use of \thresholds," that is, the requirement
that parties must receive a minimum portion of votes (e.g., 2% or 5%) in order to get
representation. As parties below the threshold do not get any seats, parties above it
get over-represented. Similarly, majoritarian representation is usually combined with
the subdivision of the national political arena into a number of subnational \districts,"
each of which holds elections for choosing a fraction of the total number of seats in
the legislatures. Even though each district uses a majoritarian rule and hence sends to
congress only representatives from the winning party, the subdivision of a country into
districts in practice prevents the existence of single-colored congresses, for di￿erent parties
usually prevail in di￿erent districts.
The incomplete vote is a special kind of electoral rule. Like PR, it allocates seats in a
single district to more than one party, generally the two largest ones. On the other hand,
like majoritarian rule, it assigns a ￿xed portion of seats to the parties, which is de￿ned
beforehand (e.g., 3/4 to the winner and 1/4 to the runner up, or 2/3-1/3), irrespective of
the amount of votes received by each force. That is, under the incomplete vote, what is at
stake in the electoral contest is who the winner is and who the runner up is, but not the
relative institutional power that they will have, which is established before the election.
To distinguish it from majoritarian and proportional representation, the incomplete vote
6is sometimes referred to as a form of \minority representation," for it is the only one that
insures that the minority in a district will obtain seats in Congress.
Electoral rules have obvious proximate e￿ects on the distribution of institutional power
among political parties, and that is the reason why, as Giovanni Sartori noted, party lead-
ers invest so much time in Congress looking for support for their preferred rule. In general,
parties that are small or expect to become small advocate proportional representation,
whereas majoritarian rules are the option that best suits the interests of parties with 50%
or more of the electoral support.3 Electoral rules are also considered to have important
deep e￿ects on the capacity of elected authorities to govern and political stability. Ac-
cording to a standard argument, in fact, positive proximate e￿ects are associated with
negative deep e￿ects, and vice versa|the so-called trade-o￿ between representativeness
and governability.4 Majoritarian rules score low on representativeness because they tend
to leave small parties with no seats in the legislatures, but they foster stability by induc-
ing clear institutional majorities. Proportional rules favor the representation of di￿erent
parties but, according to the argument, the frequent lack of clear majorities and the larger
number of parties in Congress make coalition-formation and decision-making more di￿-
cult, potentially resulting in power vacuums. In the Colombian case, however, no trade-o￿
between representativeness and governability existed during the period 1850-1950. In fact,
as we will see, Colombia’s stability after 1905 was achieved by making the political system
more representative.
4 The Colombian transition to PR: an overview
The transition from majoritarian to proportional electoral institutions in Colombia in-
volved two key reforms, separated from each other by almost a quarter century. In 1905
majoritarian rule was replaced by the incomplete vote, which established that the party
3Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering (New York: New York University Press,
1994), III.1.
4Arend Lijphardt, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1977), and Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in
Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) are the locus classicus for this kind of
argument.
7that won the elections would get 2/3 of the seats, and the remaining 1/3 would be allo-
cated to the runner-up, irrespective of the speci￿c percentages of votes. The incomplete
vote was in turn replaced by the quotient rule, a standard version of PR, in 1929|since
then, with relatively minor adjustments and the exception of the National Front period,
Colombian elections have relied on proportional representation.
Both the incomplete vote and the quotient rule were the visible results of an extended,
albeit intermittent, negotiation process between the Conservative and Liberal parties.
Both reforms were introduced while the Conservative Party was in power, during the
second half of the Conservative Republic. Neither the introduction of the incomplete vote
in 1905 nor its replacement by PR in 1929, however, ￿t the prevailing explanations of
electoral reform, most of which are variations of Stein Rokkan’s pioneering account of the
Scandinavian cases.5 According to Rokkan, reforms to majoritarian rule occur when a
Conservative Party in power anticipates that, with social modernization and the rise of
Left parties, Conservatives would become a minority force and hence that their future
position in the political arena would be better served by proportional representation than
by majority rule.
In contrast to Rokkan’s scenario of a retreating Conservative Party, both reforms in
the Colombian transition to PR were introduced at a time when the Conservatives were
expecting, correctly or mistakenly, that their dominant position would remain unchal-
lenged well into the future. Furthermore, for both Colombian parties it was apparent
that the Conservatives’ share of legislative seats would be larger under majoritarian rule
than under any alternative electoral institution, including the incomplete vote and the
quotient. Hence, the electoral reform was meant to reduce, rather than enhance, the
future institutional power of the party in government. As an additional contrast with
Rokkan’s depiction of the Scandinavian process, where electoral reform was a sponta-
neous and unilateral decision of the party in power, the incomplete vote the and quotient
rule in Colombia were a concession made by the Conservative government to the Lib-
eral opposition, which had advocated electoral reform for several years and was its direct
5Stein Rokkan, Citizens, Elections, Parties: Approaches to the Comparative Study of the Process of
Development (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1970), 150-157.
8bene￿ciary in terms of the consequent re-allocation of legislative seats.
If electoral reform in Colombia was the product of a negotiation between the Conser-
vative government and the Liberal opposition, rather than an imposition by the former,
and if it involved a reduction of the Conservative Party’s power in Congress, the key
question is: what did the Conservatives obtained in exchange for such concession? What
motivated the Conservatives’ acceptance of an electoral reform that would redistribute
institutional positions in favor of their political rival?
It is in the speci￿c terms of the Conservative-Liberal exchange where the 1905 reform
and the 1929 reform di￿er. In 1905 the Conservative Party viewed electoral reform as a
means to achieve political paci￿cation: the incomplete vote would prevent military in-
surrections by the Liberals. Prior to 1905, the political exclusion of the opposition, as
well as the disproportion between Liberal vote share and seat share caused by majori-
tarian institutions, had encouraged Liberals to pose an almost permanent threat of civil
war. With the incomplete vote Conservatives agreed to increase the Liberal Party’s share
of legislative power from a ￿uctuating 0-5% to a ￿xed 33% of the seats, which in the
Colombian bi-partisan context necessarily occurred at the expense of the Conservatives’
own portion of power. Conservatives traded size for stability: they opted for a smaller
but safer share of legislative seats. Increased minority representation in Congress would
dissuade the Liberal opposition from insurrection.
In 1929, on the other hand, political stability was not at stake. Rather, a deep division
within the Conservative Party around the party’s candidates for the following presidential
elections pushed the two internal factions to vie for the support of the Liberal opposition.
Liberals made a transitory deal with a Conservative faction that, in exchange for electoral
collaboration against the other faction, gave decisive legislative support to the introduc-
tion of the quotient rule. Hence, whereas in 1905 the vast majority of the Conservative
leaders agreed to a reform of electoral rules out of fear of a continuation of political chaos,
in 1929 only a faction of the Conservative Party supported electoral reform, and it did so
in exchange for a short-term electoral bene￿t.
Although the incomplete vote was a hybrid electoral formula that became obsolete
in the course of a couple of decades, its role in Colombia’s political history has been
9substantially more important than proportional representation. The introduction of the
incomplete vote was a true in￿ection point, one that closed the chapter of recurrent civil
wars that had dominated the country since independence, and inaugurated a four-decade
period of uninterrupted political stability. Under the incomplete vote, Liberals gave up
rebellion and Conservatives stopped repression. In this sense, the incomplete vote was
the pillar of the institutional environment that encouraged the development of the co￿ee
industry and the modernization of the Colombian economy in the ￿rst half of the 20th
century.
The introduction of proportional representation, on the other hand, involved signi￿-
cantly smaller proximate e￿ects on the redistribution of political power, as well as smaller
deep e￿ects on political stability. In terms of the proximate e￿ects, whereas the incomplete
vote was meant to increase 10 times Liberals’ representation in Congress, proportional
representation was expected to carry a small positive adjustment in the Liberal share,
from a ￿xed 1/3 of the seats under the incomplete vote to an average of 35% or 40%
under the quotient. That is, whereas the incomplete vote increased Liberals’ institutional
power by 1,000%, the quotient was expected to do so by only 20%. In terms of the deep
e￿ects, the stakes of the two reforms were dramatically di￿erent. The risks of political
instability if the 1905 reform had failed would have been much higher, at least in the long
run, than if the 1929 reform had failed. In 1905 leaders of both parties were remarkably
aware that the continuation of majoritarian rule would have forced the Liberal party into
\anti-system" tactics, whereas in 1929 Liberals were deriving enough power from pre-
vailing institutions to completely discard the option of insurrection. Liberals were too
satis￿ed with the incomplete vote for the Conservative Party to believe that they would
engage in civil war if it was not replaced by proportional representation. The following
two sections provide, in turn, an in-depth analysis of the antecedents, causes and e￿ects
of the 1905 and 1929 reforms.
105 The 1905 Reform: Incomplete Vote and Civil War
5.1 La Regeneraci￿ on and its Rivals
The 1905 reform had a crucial antecedent in a failed legislative proposal to establish
\minority representation" in 1898.6 For a considerable number of politicians and observers
of the time, the failure of the 1898 reform proposal had catastrophic consequences. In their
view, reform would have prevented the Thousand Days’ War. The legislative proposal
was drafted by dissident Conservative representatives who feared that Liberals would
rebel against La Regeneraci￿ on unless they were secured a portion of institutional power
that re￿ected at least part of their electoral force. The reform proposal seemed to have
majority support in Congress, but both the President and the Senate vetoed it. The
political process leading to the reform proposal, its blockage, and the subsequent political
repercussions illustrate the intimate connection between disproportional distribution of
power and civil war.
In post-Independence Colombia, governments of both political signs resorted to legal
and illegal means to prevent the opposition from having a share of institutional power
that was proportional to its levels of social support. Nevertheless, exclusion of the opposi-
tion reached an historical peak under La Regeneraci￿ on. In e￿ect, the 1880s witnessed two
innovations, one in the composition of subnational executives and the other of national
legislatures, that resulted in virtual monopolization of power by the Conservative party.
The 1886 Constitution, the legal basis of La Regeneraci￿ on, put a drastic end to more
than two decades of hyper-federalism by introducing a unitary system of government that
empowered the President to appoint governors in all states (renamed as departments). In
practice, such legal innovation meant Conservative control of every subnational govern-
ment, even in regions that were traditional bastions of Liberal support, like Santander.
6In the Age of the Olimpo Radical, states were empowered to choose their own electoral systems for
selecting national and local legislators. All states adopted majoritarian representation, except for Tolima,
which adopted the incomplete vote (provincial Constitutions of 1867, 1870 and 1877). That is the only
antecedent prior to debates at the national level. However, in none of the debates reviewed in this
paper was the Tolima antecedent referred to by the protagonists. The Tolima antecedent is nonetheless
remarkable for its ground-breaking character. Apparently, the incomplete vote formula was invented by
Condorcet, who included it in a Constitutional draft he proposed to the French Constitutional Convention
of 1793.
11Conservative re-centralization thus introduced a sharp contrast with prior Liberal admin-
istrations: before 1886 federalism had allowed for the re￿ection of local balances of power
in the makeup of provincial governments, which in turn resulted in the control of several
states|including a key state like Antioquia|by the opposition party.
During La Regeneraci￿ on the participation of the Liberal party in Congress also became
negligible. In contrast to the situation of the opposition party in prior decades, only two
Liberal representatives occupied seats in Congress between 1886 and the outbreak of war
in 1899.7 The drastic decrease of the Liberal presence in the legislature was in part an
e￿ect of reduced electoral support and the adoption of abstention as a de-legitimizing
tactic. But it also re￿ected fraud, intimidation, repression and obstruction by the Con-
servative government, as well as the tighter o￿cial control over local politics and electoral
boards made possible by re-centralization. To weaken the Liberal party’s organization
and obstruct its activities, La Regeneraci￿ on relied on a key legal weapon, the Law number
61 of May 1888, known as the Ley de los Caballos (Law of the Horses), for its pretext was
the decapitation of a few horses in Palmira (department of Cauca), which the government
decided was a sign of a Liberal conspiracy. Coupled with a decree restricting the press
issued a few months before, Law 61 granted the president extraordinary faculties beyond
the control of the Congress and the courts: it allowed the Executive to unilaterally ban
or repress political activities that the president himself considered \o￿ensive of pubic or-
der," a de￿nition that conveniently provided ample leeway to neutralize the opposition.
Deemed \subversive" by the government, a range of Liberal meetings and conventions
were forbidden, several party leaders were sent to jail or exile, and there was almost no
Liberal periodical that, at some point in time, was not suspended or shut down. The latter
was particularly harmful to Liberals, as the press was the main instrument of intra-party
communication and external propaganda. Hence, anemic legislative representation, cou-
pled with exclusion from regional government and o￿cial persecution, narrowed Liberals’
7The ￿rst one, only elected in 1892, was Luis A. Robles, a representative from Medell￿ ￿n in Antioquia,
perhaps the state where internal divisions within the Conservative camp were most serious. Rafael Uribe
Uribe was elected in 1896, also from Antioquia (Sopetr￿ an). A third Liberal politician, Santiago P￿ erez,
was also elected to Congress in 1896 (from Santo Domingo in Antioquia) but he refused to take his seat
in protest for alleged electoral fraud and manipulation in other districts.
12institutional power to minimal levels in Colombian history.
The politics of La Regeneraci￿ on sparked opposition even within the ￿les of the Conserv-
ative party. The Conservative schism can be traced back to a congressional debate in 1888
over a proposal to strengthen territorial centralization, but it intensi￿ed over the course
of the following years, fueled by periodic disputes over nominations to the presidency and
other political positions. Division became irreversible in 1896 when President Antonio
Caro (1892-1898) revealed his intention to get re-elected. The Conservative party divided
itself into a National block, which supported the government, and a dissident faction, the
Hist￿ oricos. As revealed in the writings of Carlos Mart￿ ￿nez Silva, founder and top intellec-
tual of the dissident movement, Hist￿ oricos rejected o￿cial politics both on ideological and
strategic grounds. For Mart￿ ￿nez Silva, the suppression of the opposition’s political rights
not only was incompatible with the Conservative Party’s foundational principles but also
risked the breakdown of political order by forcing Liberals into revolutionary tactics.
Revolution was, in fact, the main option for many Liberals. But the Liberal party
was also divided. Starting in 1896, however, the faction of the Paci￿stas, mostly old
leaders from the Radical period, gradually lost ground to the belligerent group, a younger
generation of Liberal activists headed by Rafael Uribe Uribe. Both sectors shared the goal
of dismantling the exclusionary structure of La Regeneraci￿ on. However, whereas Paci￿stas
considered that a rebellion would be counterproductive given the military superiority of
the government’s forces and favored the strategy of forming an alliance with the Hist￿ orico
block, Uribe Uribe and his followers viewed war and the threat of war as the only path
to reform.
5.2 1898: Failed Reform and War
It is against the backdrop of Liberal exclusion, Conservative dissension and danger of war
that dissident Conservatives in Congress and the Senate took steps to reform the electoral
law in 1898. In early August, Senator Carlos Calder￿ on Reyes, and Representatives Eliseo
Arbel￿ aez and Jos￿ e Vicente Concha, who would become president in 1914-1918, presented
separate proposals to introduce \minority representation" by means of the incomplete
vote. Before joining the ￿les of the Hist￿ orico faction, Calder￿ on Reyes had served in the
13cabinet of Caro’s government, and had authored the 1888 Electoral Code, which estab-
lished majoritarian representation for all national and subnational Colombian elections
(Law 7). Ten years later, Calder￿ on considered that his code was \full of mistakes," and
that not reforming it would be equivalent \to declaring that only the party in power
has the right to vote [and to] consolidating a tyranny by scienti￿c means."8 Calder￿ on
described La Regeneraci￿ on as a force transforming \a nation in which two parties have
controlled the Government and exerted powerful in￿uences" into a regime \in which only
one of those parties has a voice and a place in the Parliament and the Assemblies, only
one has a say in the big issues of the country [...] whereas the other one is completely
excluded."9 \Peace can only be guaranteed," Calder￿ on remarked, \with the reform of
the electoral law."10 Defenders of the reform in Congress also drew a strong connection
between power-sharing and peace. Arbel￿ aez claimed that his project of electoral reform
\responded to the burning need of pacifying the spirits."11
The spirits that needed to be paci￿ed belonged, of course, to Liberal politicians.
Starting in 1891, every Liberal convention, program and manifesto demanded electoral
reform, together with the abolition of the Law of the Horses. Liberals wanted electoral
reform in order to obtain a greater share of institutional power. They systematically
denounced fraud and exclusion from legislatures, but only rarely were they clear as to the
speci￿c remedies to those problems. When Historical Conservatives proposed the formula
of the incomplete vote in 1898, Uribe Uribe led its defense as if the project had been
designed by the Liberal party itself. In the process, he advanced one of the most brilliant
statements for power-sharing in Colombia|and launched the strongest warning against
La Regeneraci￿ on. In his intervention of September 19, he stated that \Colombia’s biggest
problem is that of peace. This problem can only be solved in one way: by giving justice
to the Liberal party. And that justice can only be achieved by approving the proposed
reforms."12
8Anales del Senado (AS) 1898: 105-106.
9AS 1898: 106.
10AS 1898: 105-106.
11Anales de la C￿ amara de Representantes (ACR) 1898: 313.
12ACR 1898: 386.
14Even though framed in terms of \political equality," Uribe Uribe’s discourse made
clear that, for Liberals, the main grievance under La Regeneraci￿ on was exclusion from
power. After asserting that \there is no equality before the law," he proceeded to list
pieces of evidence of such inequality: \In thirteen years only two Liberal representatives
went to Congress, in di￿erent terms; we have never had a seat in the Senate; by chance
we have had two delegates in the legislatures of Antioquia and Panam￿ a; when we have
chosen o￿cials for municipal councils, their terms were revoked by the President or the
Governor of the Department; we have had nobody in the Ministries, in the Governorships,
in the judicial branch or the electoral boards to protect and defend us."13 In Uribe Uribe’s
analysis, Liberal exclusion from power involved the breakdown of the underlying \political
contract." Given that \the proportional in￿uence in public a￿airs that should correspond
to our party has been persistently denied," both Liberals and Conservatives should notice
that \[t]he constitutional promise has not been ful￿lled: the payment in rights in exchange
for our obedience has not been delivered."14
Political analysis was followed by military ultimatum:
I am not threatening or provoking. I am not coming here as the Roman
consul before the Senate of Carthage, bringing in his uniform the options ‘war
or peace’ for you to choose. I am just predicting the unavoidable. I am just
warning that this, which today is a peaceful petition in favor of our rights, if
you deny it, tomorrow will become a demand backed by the arms, and then,
after costly sacri￿ces, one of two things will occur: if we win, we will give to
ourselves not only what we are demanding today, or the full rights that belong
to us, but even more than that, at your expense, because of the irresistible
impetus given by victory; or, if we loose, not for that will our right die, and
you will spend more resources in continuing oppressing us than those required
to live with us in peace and equality [...] Give us the freedom to make public
and defend our rights with the vote, the quill, and the lips; otherwise, nobody
13ACR 1898: 389.
14ACR 1898: 390.
15in the world will have enough power to silence the barrels of our ri￿es.15
Faced with the option of concession or war, National Conservatives would eventually
risk war. But before it was too late to avoid the catastrophe, hopes of reform had tem-
porally revived as Vice-president Jos￿ e Manuel Marroqu￿ ￿n gave his explicit support to a
new electoral law, and encouraged consideration of the proposals in Congress. Marroqu￿ ￿n
was in charge of the executive power because 84-year-old President Manuel Sanclemente
had been granted a leave for health reasons. However, Marroqu￿ ￿n’s conciliatory attitude
provoked a reaction by former president Caro, who urged Sanclemente to resume active
presidential functions and restore the status quo ante.16 Sanclemente did shut the door
to reform, instructing the Senate, where Nationals were a majority, to block the proposal.
Before considering a new electoral law, Sanclemente remarked, \it would be better to
wait for more peaceful times, so that an undisturbed study of experience and institu-
tional options can suggest what is best for the public good."17 With remarkable political
perception, Uribe Uribe had predicted in his defense of the reform that Nationals would
allege inopportune times, in anticipation of which he claimed that \reforms are the cause
of appeasement, so appeasement should not be taken as a precondition for reform." To
demand \serenity" before solving the grievance is like \asking a doctor to wait until the
disease is gone before providing the cure."18 With the return of Sanclemente and the
interruption of the short-lived reform movement headed by Marroqu￿ ￿n, the last hopes of
reform vanished|and so did the chances of peace.
If Sanclemente’s hostility to reform showed that bellicose Liberals were right in that La
Regeneraci￿ on would not transform itself from inside, war con￿rmed that Paci￿sta Liberals
were right in that the Conservative government was too powerful to be defeated militarily.
The Thousand Days’ War (October 1898 { November 1902), the most destructive civil
15ACR 1898: 390.
16Marroqu￿ ￿n’s reformism was clearly an unintended consequence of a careful gambit in \political pa-
leontology," as contemporaries dubbed it, made by Caro in 1897. Caro’s gambit consisted in forcing
the nomination of 84-year-old Sanclemente for the presidency and 81-year-old Marroqu￿ ￿n for the vice-
presidency, with the expectation that their poor health or death would result in presidential power
retuning to his hands.
17Monsalve Mart￿ ￿nez, Manuel. Colombia, posesiones presidenciales, 1810-1954. (Bogot￿ a; Editorial
Iqueima, 1954). 310.
18ACR 1898: 387.
16war in 19th century Latin America, became a lost cause for the Liberals after the decisive
defeat in the battle of Palonegro in May 1900. A coup by Historical Conservatives a
few months after Palonegro succeeded in displacing Sanclemente from power and placing
Marroqu￿ ￿n in the presidency. However, Marroqu￿ ￿n betrayed the Historicals’ expectations
of reform and paci￿cation (in the same way that he had betrayed Nationals’ plans in
1898 when he had to temporarily replace Sanclemente). To gain independence from the
group that had sponsored his return to power, Marroqu￿ ￿n relied on new political forces
created in the course of the war aligned behind Ar￿ ￿stides Fern￿ andez, a former doorman
whose ferocious methods for capturing and repressing Liberals earned him rapid promotion
through Conservative ranks. Proving in retrospect that his conciliatory policy towards
the Liberal party in 1898 had been a purely tactical expedient, in 1900, as opposition
forces were on the verge of disarticulation, Marroqu￿ ￿n decided to in￿ict an irreversible
defeat on Liberals.
5.3 Negotiating Peace ... and Power-sharing
Between Marroqu￿ ￿n’s coup in 1900 and the end of war, peace negotiations gave rise to a
second (and ￿nal) antecedent of the 1905 reform. After the outbreak of war, and before the
defeat at Palonegro, Liberals had suspended the demand for power-sharing and minority
representation. A reason for that attitude certainly was that peace and the return to
institutional life seemed too distant. But Liberals may also have remained silent on the
issue of minority representation because the event of a military victory would return them
to government, and once in power, it was not clear that Liberals would be willing to share
power with the opposition. It was doubtful that Liberals in government would remain
faithful to the principles they had embraced while in the opposition.
Almost immediately after the defeat at Palonegro, when Liberals realized that victory
was practically impossible, Uribe Uribe dug up the banner of minority representation.
Liberals began to signal that reform of electoral rules was the price they demanded for
capitulation. Moreover, initial events surrounding Marroqu￿ ￿n’s coup encouraged Liberal’s
hopes of electoral reform. For the ideologues of the coup, among whom Mart￿ ￿nez Silva
was prominent again, its raison d’etre was to end the war and to lay the basis of future
17peace by reinstalling the debate on electoral reform and Liberal participation in power.
Marroqu￿ ￿n’s unexpected change of plans obviously cut o￿ the latent agreement between
Historical Conservative and Liberals, who nevertheless made several attempts to end the
war under mutually satisfactory terms.
At the beginning of 1901 Uribe Uribe and Mart￿ ￿nez Silva, leading ￿gures of the new
paci￿cation e￿orts, initiated a series of contacts. In March Uribe Uribe traveled to New
York, where Mart￿ ￿nez Silva was sent by the government on a diplomatic mission, which
most observers interpreted as an elegant form of exile. In a revealing communication,
Uribe Uribe told Mart￿ ￿nez Silva that \the war could have ended the minute after Mar-
roqu￿ ￿n took power, especially if one takes into account the common goals of the Liberal and
the [Historical] Conservative parties, and the similar methods employed by one and the
other [i.e., revolution and coup] in order to overthrow the National regime." Nonetheless,
Uribe Uribe regretted, the government did not o￿er \an acceptable basis for an agree-
ment with the Liberal chiefs." Marroqu￿ ￿n only promised safe-conducts, and demanded
\unconditional surrender, ignoring that Liberals form a political party with the right to
be acknowledged as a social force and to receive proper representation."19
Another year of attrition, which reduced the insurrection to intermittent guerrilla
warfare out of the control of Liberal generals, made clear to all actors involved that the
Liberal regular army had no option but capitulation. Still, Uribe Uribe and the other
Liberal general, Benjam￿ ￿n Herrera|who had achieved impressive victories in Panam￿ a but
could not move his forces into the subcontinent|continued their e￿orts to extract political
concessions from the government before signing a peace treaty. Liberals’ proposals prior
to the signature of the Tratado de Neerlandia (Treaty of Neerlandia) were shaped by the
correspondence between Uribe Uribe and Colonel Carlos Adolfo Urueta, the emissary of
the Liberal army before the government. Uribe Uribe instructed Urueta to request, as
the condition for peace, the creation of an extraordinary Congress to treat constitutional
reforms. Uribe Uribe also demanded a special mechanism for choosing the members of the
Congress to insure Liberals that it was not going to be a \charade." Quoting a proposal he
19Otto Morales Benitez, Sanclemente, Marroquin, El Liberalismo y Panam￿ a (Bogot￿ a: Stamato editores,
1991).
18had made to Mart￿ ￿nez Silva in New York, Uribe Uribe urged the government, via Urueta,
\to accept that, out of the 64 seats in the Congress, 25 will be allocated to the Liberal
party, which is a very modest demand."20
In addition to providing further evidence that Liberals’ main concern was participa-
tion in power, the communication to Urueta reveals that Uribe Uribe was perfectly aware
of his weak bargaining position, and the associated lack of credibility of any promise
that the government could extend. For him, Liberals should turn in their weapons af-
ter the congress met in order to guarantee the inclusion of Liberal representatives. But,
he recognized, \it seems quite impossible to me that the Government will agree to this
condition [i.e., a postponement of disarmament]."21 If Conservatives required military de-
mobilization before making the promise of a special extraordinary congress with Liberal
participation, then Liberals would be left with no tangible resources to sanction the Con-
servatives if they decided to renege on their promise. Hence, the very precondition of the
government’s promise (demobilization), made it non-credible. After meeting government
delegates, Urueta informed Uribe Uribe that disarmament was in fact a precondition for
signing any peace treaty. Moreover, after reviewing the situation of the Liberal army
across the country, Urueta advised Uribe Uribe to give up hopes of concessions other
than safe-conducts and reform promises. The Tratado de Neerlandia was ￿nally drafted
on October 24 and signed four days later. It had sixteen clauses: no. 1 and no. 3 de-
￿ned the steps that the demobilization of the Liberal army should follow, and only no.
14 stated that \The Liberal emissary is con￿dent that the President will follow through
on his promise that the Liberal party will have fair representation in Municipal coun-
cils, Departmental assemblies, and the National Congress."22 A few weeks later Benjam￿ ￿n
Herrera signed the Tratado de Wisconsin (the Treaty of Wisconsin, signed on board the
U.S. battleship Wisconsin), which formally ended the war. The only political clause in
the treaty included a nominal commitment by the Conservative government to encourage
discussion of the proposals of electoral reform that had been submitted to the Congress
20Antecedentes del Tratado de Neerlandia 1902: 12.
21Antecedentes del Tratado de Neerlandia 1902: 13.
22Antecedentes del Tratado de Neerlandia 1902: 24.
19in 1898 (clause 7-B).
5.4 Incomplete vote in 1905: innovation
No politician in 1899 foresaw the devastating magnitude that the war would have. Events,
duration and costs escaped the control of both Conservative and Liberal leaders. In the
balance sheet, the column of intended consequences was only an in￿nitesimal fraction of
the column of unintended ones. The \little skirmish of three months" that some in the gov-
ernment had predicted ended up lasting more than three years, causing more than 90,000
deaths and encouraging the separation of Panam￿ a as an independent mini-republic.23 Lib-
eral leaders, in turn, powerlessly witnessed how their revolution degenerated into anarchic
guerrilla and other politically futile impulses. Probably both Conservative and Liberal
politicians would have changed their decisions on the eve of war if they had known that,
by the end of 1903, 4% of the male population would die, 7% of the territory would be
lost, and the Colombian economy would su￿er four years of paralysis in some regions, and
massive destruction in others.
Especially after the loss of Panam￿ a, preventing future wars became a top priority for
political leaders of almost every a￿liation. For the ￿rst time since the creation of parties,
a broadly bipartisan consensus emerged by 1904. The consensus was built around the
diagnosis of past ills and their remedies for the future. Intransigent elements from both
parties ￿nally seemed to converge to the vision of moderates, who insisted that the blame
for past and recent chaos belonged to the vieja iniquidad (the \old iniquity"), Mart￿ ￿nez
Silva’s celebrated formula to describe the persistent political exclusion of the opposition
by the government.24 In the 1904 elections, with the support of moderate Conservatives
and Liberals, General Rafael Reyes was chosen as president under the lemma \Peace
and Concord."25 Soon after his possession, a stalemate with the Congress, chosen under
Marroqu￿ ￿n’s presidential term, led Reyes to close it on December 14, eliminating in the
process remaining intransigent Conservative elements from the political arena. Instead of
23See Jorge Orlando Melo, \La Rep￿ ublica Conservadora" in Ideolog￿ ￿a y Sociedad (Bogot￿ a 1975).
24Revistas Pol￿ ￿ticas Publicadas en el Repertorio (Bogot￿ a: Imprenta Nacional, 1934), 96.
25Historians disagree as to the role of fraud in this election, but they agree that he was the most popular
candidate.
20calling another Congress, the new President decided to reform the Constitution and call
a Constitutional Assembly, which would be inaugurated on March 15th 1905.
Anticipating future legislation on the matter, Reyes made sure that all political forces
were represented in the Assembly. Each of the nine departments was to send three
members, one from each Conservative faction, and the third one from the Liberal party.
Most prominent Colombian politicians became members of the Assembly, including Victor
Manuel Salazar, a Conservative general who had excelled at the war, future presidential
candidate Alfredo V￿ azquez Cobo, the ubiquitous Uribe Uribe, and Herrera.
The assembly promptly applied the remedy prescribed in the post-war shared diagno-
sis: on April 13 a Constitutional Amendment introducing \minority representation" was
passed. The legislative process was as fast as formal procedures allowed (four days), and
the project received unanimous support. Bonifacio V￿ elez, Minister of Government and di-
rect delegate of President Reyes before the Assembly, submitted the proposal of electoral
reform on April 10th. The proposal’s declared goal was to insure the representation of
the opposition in the legislatures, but did not de￿ne the speci￿c electoral rule to achieve
it, which would be the issue of an ordinary law, complementary to the constitutional
amendment. Article 4, the core of the project, stated that \in all popular elections that
have the goal of forming public corporations [e.g., national and regional legislatures], the
right of minorities to be represented is acknowledged, and the law will de￿ne the form and
terms under which such representation will be carried out."26 That same day the project
was approved by unanimity in \￿rst debate," which according to Colombian legislative
rules meant that representatives agreed to submit the proposal to a special commission in
charge of studying it (according to the rules, the second debate is when modi￿cations to
the project, as suggested by the commission and the ￿oor, are introduced, and the third
and last round approves or rejects the ￿nal draft).
26Anales de la Asamblea Nacional (AAN) 1905: 73. The Anales have an important typo. In the place
where they should have published the draft of the law, instead of reproducing the draft, they mistakenly
included the ￿nal version as approved three days later, which, very crucially, included the phrase \and the
appointment of Senators" between the words \corporations" and \the right." The mistake is important
because its introduction was precisely a modi￿cation to the original project by Reyes-V￿ elez suggested by
a Liberal representative the day after the proposal was submitted (see below). We discovered the mistake
by contrasting the Anales with the original actas of the session. The Anales are not faithful to the actas.
For the actual acta, see Archivo del Congreso, Leyes aut￿ ografas 1 a 21 de 1905, I: 70-74.
21On April 11th the commission, formed by Herrera (from Santander), Felipe Angulo
(Bol￿ ￿var), a former prot￿ eg￿ ee of N￿ u~ nez, and the Reyista Gerardo Pulecio (Cundinamarca),
issued the report. Its ￿rst paragraph claimed that \this reform is the peace for the future;
it is the ￿rst time national unity is formally proclaimed [...] for no Constitution since 1811
had had the courage to acknowledge the right of minorities to be represented; that was
the cause of the countless civil wars that have scorched the country."27 The commission
also suggested to the body of representatives that no modi￿cations to the project were
necessary. The only voices heard that day were those of Liberal Representatives Juan
Manrique (from Cundinamarca), who only praised the proposal, and Jos￿ e Mar￿ ￿a Quijano
Wallis (Cauca), who proposed a modi￿cation|a small but crucial addition to article 4,
the \soul of the proposal."28 After describing minority representation as \a guarantee for
future peace in the Republic," Quijano noticed that article 4, by referring to bodies chosen
in \popular elections," left out the selection process of the Senate, the members of which
were not chosen popularly, but were indirectly appointed by departmental assemblies.
Pulecio, the president of the commission, acknowledged the omission, implying that it
was unintentional, and enthusiastically agreed to the modi￿cation.29 The new version
of article 4, then, stated: \in all popular elections that have the goal of forming public
corporations, and in the appointment of Senators, the right of minorities to be represented
is acknowledged ..." All representatives gave their support to the modi￿ed version of the
project. It became law the following day with unanimous approval, and was published
on April 13th. The process was so swift, especially when compared to Colombia’s own
antecedents, that the President of the Assembly asked that a special mention to the
\exemplary session" be put on the public record, emphasizing how \calm and composed
the discussion was, even though the topic has been one of the most delicate and thorny
27AAN 1905: 73.
28Juan E. Manrique was a member of the Directorio of the Liberal party before the war. He was a
Paci￿st who tried various formulas, mostly electoral formulas, to prevent the war. On September 29th
1898 he signed a pact with President Marroqu￿ ￿n to encourage electoral reform. Later on he complained
about blockage by Sanclemente and the Senate. See El Nuevo Tiempo Jan 1903
29AAN 1905: 244-5. By showing the existence of this modi￿cation, we are rectifying the only other
study of this amendment, due to Barbosa. Barbosa’s otherwise complete review of the law suggests no
modi￿cations were introduced to the original project by Reyes-V￿ elez, and states that no interventions
were made during the second debate. This is incorrect. At least three people participated in the second
debate (Manrique, Quijano and Pulecio) and a non-trivial modi￿cation was made.
22issues for political parties in Colombia."30
The constitutional amendment introduced minority representation as a principle, but
did not de￿ne the speci￿c electoral rule that would make the principle operative in prac-
tice. Two weeks after the amendment, by Law 42, the Legislative Assembly chose the
incomplete vote. Article 33 of the law stated that two thirds of the seats in Congress and
the Senate, as well as in regional legislatures and electoral boards, would correspond to
the electoral majority, and the remaining third to the minority.31 The reform made every
district have at least three representatives. For the computation of shares in districts
where the number of seats at stake was not divisible by three, the Law required that such
number be elevated to the next one that was divisible by three, and that the majority get
2/3 of the new number minus 1 (e.g., in districts with 7 representatives, the two thirds
were computed in relation to 9, which, after the subtraction of one seat to the major-
ity, left the opposition with 2 seats). The original draft of the law was again authored
by V￿ elez. However, this time V￿ elez’s proposal did undergo substantial modi￿cation be-
fore becoming law. Instead of the incomplete vote, article 26 in V￿ elez’s proposal opted
for a new demarcation of electoral districts that favored, \as much as possible, minority
representation."32 Each district would chose only one representative, but districts were
supposed to be rede￿ned so as to create some units in which Liberals were majority and
hence could obtain the corresponding seat. The commission in charge of studying the
draft|formed by J. S. Insignares S., named governor of Bol￿ ￿var by Reyes, and Liberal
Alejandro P￿ erez|discussed the proposal with the other members of the Assembly, and
decided to eliminate article 26 and replaced it with the 2/3 incomplete vote formula. The
commission pointed out that single-member districts, if properly demarcated, may be in
the interest of all parties, but they would actually \leave minorities within the district
with no representation." The incomplete vote, on the other hand, would \insure and




32Archivo del Congreso, Leyes aut￿ ografas 22 a 50 de 1905, II: 363.
33AAN 1905: 147, 148.
23The alteration of the Executive’s original project by the commission, and the subse-
quent approval of the reformed version, reveals that Reyes did not have an automatic
majority in the Assembly. Far from a rubber stump, the Assembly showed autonomy and
determination to innovate. Less clear are the government’s original intentions. Did the
government proposal deliberately mean to temper concessions to the Liberal minority? Or
was V￿ elez well-intentioned but he only ignored the proper \technology" to translate the
principle of minority representation into operative rules for political practice? Although
scarce, public records of the legislative process suggest a third option: V￿ elez was well-
intentioned, and knew the alternatives, but he had sincerely believed that re-districting
was the best option for achieving minority representation. Counterarguments by the As-
sembly may have changed his mind. The report of the commission, for instance, mentions
that the introduction of the incomplete vote in the revised draft was \agreed upon with
the Minister."34 Given the date of the commission’s report (April 26), negotiations with
the minister seemed to have been extraordinarily expeditious. Moreover, the same day
the report was read, V￿ elez acknowledged the defects of his original proposal, arguing that
\it left intact the hateful division of the Colombian family into winners and losers, which
sooner or later will explode into bloody revolutions."35 By contrast, the new legislative
project would insure that \no more scandals will occur," and the commission should be
\praised for its clever e￿orts" at reshaping it.36
5.5 Incomplete vote in 1910 and 1916: rati￿cation
Reyes’s government was overthrown ￿ve years after its inauguration, but minority repre-
sentation as an institution survived and in fact became a permanent feature of Colom-
bia’s political system. Two critical indications of the level of consensus achieved by the
incomplete vote as a power-sharing formula were produced in 1910 and 1916. In 1910 a
Constitutional Assembly was convened to reform the constitution. Bi-partisan in compo-
sition, the assembly made the 1886 constitution more liberal. Crucially, it eliminated all




24representation. In 1916, a new electoral code was approved in order to systematize dis-
perse pieces of electoral legislation into a single body of rules. It covered several ￿elds,
including the de￿nition of citizenship, the organization of electoral justice, and the sched-
ule for elections|regarding Colombia’s electoral system, it rati￿ed the incomplete vote.
Therefore, in the context of broader institutional reforms, legislative bodies twice had the
opportunity to change the electoral system in the 1910s, but on both occasions Liberals
and Conservatives agreed to preserve minority representation.37
Reyes’s fall and the constitutional reform of 1910 are closely connected events, for they
were both the result of the rise of a new bipartisan coalition, the Republican Union. Re-
publicanism grew mainly as a reaction against Reyes’s dictatorial methods of rule, which
included the closure of the Congress and the adoption of extraordinary executive powers.
The Conservative leg of the new coalition was largely coterminous with the old Historical
faction. The Liberal leg, in turn, was represented by politicians who had progressively
removed their support to the government in response not only to authoritarian measures
but also to the weakening of the Nationals, the reactionary faction within the Conser-
vative camp. Once the threat from the Nationals vanished, Liberals who had initially
supported Reyes out of fear of a restoration of the La Regeneraci￿ on regime, decided to
join the Republican opposition. Exceptions to the re-alignment of the Liberal elite in-
cluded top collaborators of Reyes, most prominently Uribe Uribe and his followers. The
main component of the Republicans’ social base was the progressive business commu-
nity of Antioquia, mainly landowners and bankers who resented Reyes’s intervention in
the economy and the cases of corruption derived from o￿cial contracts to build public
infrastructure.
After forcing Reyes’s resignation in June 1909, and winning the 1910 presidential
election behind the candidacy of Carlos E. Restrepo, the Republican Union encouraged
constitutional reform.38 Many of the authoritarian methods repudiated by the Republi-
37In 1909 Uribe Uribe presented a project for the systematization of electoral rules that also took for
granted the incomplete vote was the best electoral rule.
38The triggering event of Reyes’s fall was a new treaty to normalize relations with the US after its
support to the independence of Panam￿ a. The treaty provided Republicans an opportunity to mobilize
opposition in March, led by Nicol￿ as Esguerra in the Congress and a young Enrique Olaya Herrera, who
organized the students’ movement, in the streets.
25cans had acquired constitutional status during 1905-09 due to Reyes’s practice of issuing
executive decrees and submitting them to rati￿cation by ad hoc constitutional assemblies.
Republicans were determined to revise the changes by Reyes, but more generally the 1910
reform was meant to translate into constitutional norms the strong bipartisan consensus
that had evolved since the end of the war on the need of strengthening the rule of law
and the rights of the opposition. The reform reduced the power of the Executive and
enhanced that of the Congress. Thus, presidential terms were shortened from six to four
years, the Executive became accountable for all violations to the Constitution|not just
the few speci￿c cases foreseen by the 1886 text|and immediate reelection of the president
was forbidden, whereas the Congress was assigned a chief role in the direction of foreign
relations and the selection of members of the Supreme Court, and annual meetings of the
legislatures were protected from presidential interference.39 Although these reforms in-
volved important breaks in relation to the Reyes’s regime, the key continuity was recorded
at the level of the electoral rules.
During the second half of May, at least four separate projects concerning electoral
rules were submitted to the constitutional assembly, including one by Nicol￿ as Esguerra
(May 15), the last survivor of the Radical Liberal period, founding ￿gure of the Repub-
lican Union, and main architect of the constitutional reform. All four projects embraced
minority representation as a general principle, and three of them speci￿ed the incomplete
vote as the formula to make it operational in practice. The project enforcing only the
general principle, presented by Conservative Hernando Holguin y Caro on May 20th, was
discussed on May 26th and became law the following day. From the extraordinary pace of
the legislative process it can be inferred that no signi￿cant opposition to the project was
raised.40 As in 1905, the ￿nal version of the constitutional amendment left to ordinary
law the determination of the speci￿c electoral rule, but, in contrast to its predecessor, it
mentioned possible operational formulas: \All elections in which more than two individu-
als are to be chosen will be ruled by the incomplete vote, the quotient rule, the cumulative
39Other important reforms were the abolition of the death penalty and restrictions on the issuing of
paper money.
40There are no records of the debate, if it existed at all, so its characteristics must be deduced from its
duration.
26vote, or any other mechanism that insures the proportional representation of the parties.
The law will de￿ne the method to make this right e￿ective."41
The Republican Union proved to be a short-lived political force, but it left an enduring
legacy in Colombian politics. Once the aspiration of constitutional reform was ful￿lled,
no shared goal was left for Conservatives and Liberals to remain united within a perma-
nent coalition. Starting in 1914, with the election of Jos￿ e Vicente Concha as president,
Colombia returned to the pattern of unambiguously Conservative governments. Never-
theless, the constitutional amendments of 1910 would last eight decades. Comparing the
1910 reform to the constitutions of 1863 and 1886, observers have noted that the key
di￿erence of the 1910 amendments, and the cause of their durability, is that they were
consensually drafted by a bi-partisan assembly, expressing the institutional visions shared
by all members of the political elite, whereas the two prior constitutions were actually the
program of one party unilaterally imposed on the other after military victory.42 During
the Republican period, however, the Congress failed to supply an electoral law specifying
a method to put minority representation into e￿ect. As a result, until 1916, the legislative
vacuum was covered by the law that established the incomplete vote in 1905 (law 42/1905,
art. 33).
In 1916, by Law 85, a comprehensive electoral code was adopted for the ￿rst time.43
Although the code was an extremely long text, with 307 articles and 17 chapters, it was
essentially meant to achieve two broad goals: ￿rst, to establish a speci￿c electoral rule,
as required by the 1910 amendment; second, to strengthen controls over the electoral
processes in order to reduce fraud and manipulation by local politicians. The project
that was ￿nally approved was originally authored by Bonifacio V￿ elez, Reyes’s former
minister and author of the 1905 constitutional amendment on minority representation.
As a member of the National State Council in Concha’s government, V￿ elez submitted
41Hern￿ an Montoya, La C￿ edula y el Sufragio (Bogot￿ a: Imprenta Nacional, 1938): 26.
42See Jorge Orlando Melo, \De Carlos E. Restrepo a Marco Fidel Su￿ arez. Republicanismo y Gobiernos
Conservadores," in ￿ Alvaro Tirado Mej￿ ￿a (ed.), Nueva Historia de Colombia (Bogot￿ a: Planeta, 1989),
220-225, and Fernando Correa Uribe, Republicanismo y reforma constitucional, 1891-1910 (Medell￿ ￿n:
Universidad de Antioquia, 1996), 7-10.
43An electoral law was sanctioned in 1888, but it is not comparable with the 1916 Code in terms of
scope.
27his project to the Senate in August 1915. It privileged the incomplete vote over the
quotient rule because, V￿ elez alleged, it was a better mechanism for the representation of
the minority. A colorful table, attached at the end of his project, backed his point. In
the table V￿ elez’s had computed how results for the 1915 legislative elections would have
yielded di￿erent proportions of Liberal and Conservative seats under di￿erent electoral
systems. The table showed that the incomplete vote granted Liberals ￿ve more seats
than the quotient rule.44 Regarding the problem of fraud, the project included various
dispositions, including one (art. 168/4) that declared invalid all elections \in which the
number of votes issued is larger than the number of registered voters"|not at all an
uncommon situation in Colombian electoral contests.
V￿ elez’s draft had a long, and suggestive, genealogy. It was actually a countero￿er by
the Government in response to an old demand by the Liberal party. Starting in 1911,
Liberals had presented to the public a string of projects for an electoral code. The most
important one had been authored by Uribe Uribe. The Conservative majority in the
Senate rejected Uribe Uribe’s project in 1913, but he insisted the following year. His
assassination in October temporarily disbanded the movement in favor of a new code. In
August 1915 Uribe Uribe’s role in defense of a new code was taken on by Liberal Senators
Luis de Grei￿ and Fabio Lozano. Uribe Uribe’s original code placed a heavy emphasis
on the reduction of fraud, and proposed the c￿ edula, an individual identi￿cation card, as
the main remedy for it. The c￿ edula would be a certi￿cate of the right of an individual to
vote. It would replace in that function the lists of registered voters, the manipulation of
which allowed o￿cials in charge of voting places to arbitrarily exclude opposition voters or
to make government supporters vote more than once in the same election. Uribe Uribe’s
project did not establish any new electoral rule, indicating his satisfaction with the system
of the incomplete vote that was in e￿ect.
The project by de Grei￿ and Lozano was very similar to that of Uribe Uribe in terms
of the measures against fraud. For the electoral system, however, the 1915 Liberal project
replaced the incomplete vote with the quotient rule. According to de Grei￿, the incom-
plete vote was an eminently \unfair" mechanism because it resulted in a ￿xed proportion
44V￿ elez, Bonifacio. Proyecto de Ley sobre Reforma electoral (Bogot￿ a: Imprenta Nacional, 1905), 69-70.
28of Conservative and Liberal seats irrespective of whether Conservatives \win by 16,000
votes to 4,000 or by 10,050 to 9,050."45 Nevertheless, the opinion of Liberals in the Senate
was not uniform. Many opposition Senators, including Benjam￿ ￿n Herrera, still favored the
incomplete vote, and de Grei￿ himself was open to compromise. The bipartisan commis-
sion in charge of studying his project, which included two Liberal Senators, Herrera and
Rafael del Corral, rejected the quotient rule arguing that \given the current state of our
political culture, it is not possible for it to work correctly."46 Over the course of the de-
bate, Conservative Senators unanimously expressed themselves in favor of the incomplete
vote. Some Conservative Senators simply embraced the status quo and rejected reform
as a matter of principle. D￿ avila Florez, for instance, rejected innovation in electoral rules
arguing that \If one makes jumps, there is no evolution. This is true both in economics
and in politics."47 Other Conservative Senators saw proportional representation as a sys-
tem that was too complicated for Colombia’s level of cultural and economic development.
Exhibiting an a￿able degree political chicanery, a dialogue between Conservative Senator
Benjam￿ ￿n Guerrero and his Liberal colleague Felipe Escobar illustrates this point:
Guerrero|There is too much ignorance among our rural villages to intro-
duce proportional representation.
Escobar|Would you then sign a project of mandatory education with me?
Guerrero|No, because that would impose an unfair, even tyrannical re-
quirement on the fathers of poor families.48
Ultimately, however, behind the concern with status quo and backwardness, Conserv-
ative Senators seemed to have feared that the quotient rule would induce divisions within
their party, or the emergence of a competing third party, in relation to which the recent
experience of the Republican Union could hardly be more suggestive. Guerrero him-
self described the quotient rule as the prelude to the emergence of \divisions" and \puny





29because \we have the inescapable obligation of reorganizing the Conservative union."49
In the defense of his original project de Grei￿ had in fact attacked the incomplete vote
as an obstacle to the development of third parties, although no evidence exists about a
systematic plan by the Liberals to induce further divisions of their opponent.50 At any
rate, Guerrero feared that was the case: \Liberal Senators may complain because we do
not want to concede on the electoral innovation they advocate. But they must under-
stand that we cannot accept the unacceptable [...] Liberals will laugh if we fall into their
trap."51 Faced with the opposition of all Conservatives and several fellow Liberals, de
Grei￿ and Lozano promptly gave up on the quotient and accepted the incomplete vote.
The motive behind the change of attitude was probably that, so long as Liberals had a
share in power, de Grei￿, like Uribe Uribe before him, was less concerned about changing
the electoral rules than about reducing fraud. De Grei￿ did not want that the debate
over electoral rules delayed or interfered with the approval of the rest of the project. Also,
the legal vacuum opened by the 1910 amendment placed Liberals in an uncomfortable
political situation. As representative Victor M. Salazar noted, \law 42 of 1905 has been
tacitly abolished by amendment no. 3 of 1910; hence, the fact that since 1910 minori-
ties have been granted the right to representation is due not to the fact that the right
was guaranteed by any law, but to the fairness, sense of order, and benevolence of the
Conservative Party."52 Salazar’s point was not technically right, for the National State
Council had decreed that law no. 42 of 1905 would remain in force until a new electoral
law was approved. On the other hand, a decree by the State Council did not have the
same force as a national law, and Liberals were well aware of the di￿erence. By the end
of 1915, then, after brief consideration of an alternative electoral rule, both Liberal and
Conservative Senators agreed to preserve the incomplete vote.
In the sessions of 1915, the Liberal project received much more attention than V￿ elez’s
code. In fact, the Liberal project was approved by the Senate and sent to the Congress in





30by a commission in the Senate, the formal step before open debate. Although the Senate
was dominated by a Conservative majority and V￿ elez’s code probably expressed the o￿cial
vision on electoral a￿airs, the approval of the Liberal project was not a surprising event:
in the course of the debate, reforms were introduced to the Liberal code that made it
perfectly palatable to the Conservative majority. The 1915 Congress, however, rejected
the Liberal project. In fact, Congress’ activity reached an irreversible stalemate in the ￿rst
week of November. De Grei￿’s project would never be considered again.53 Disagreement,
however, was not over electoral rules or the incomplete vote. Rather, it was instigated
by con￿ict over the c￿ edula and the provisions against fraud. For Conservative Carlos
Jaramillo Isaza, the Senate’s project was \retrogressive and absurd [...] In our population
it is virtually impossible that people ￿nd the time to get their c￿ edulas: what will happen
with the rural workers, who cannot interrupt, not even for a second, their labor? [If the
project was approved, then] a smaller number of people would go to vote."54 In what the
Liberal minority considered an obstructionist move, Conservatives proposed to discuss
V￿ elez’s project instead of the one approved by the Senate.
In 1916, urged by the need to ￿ll the legal vacuum opened by the 1910 amendment,
the Liberal minority in the Senate assented to the proposal by the Conservative majority
to revive V￿ elez’s project and send it to the Congress. The code re￿ected the consensus
on electoral rules, but it fell short of meeting Liberals’ expectations about the reduction
of fraud. For instance, V￿ elez’s project had no c￿ edula and its provisions against fraud,
including the one canceling elections with more votes than voters, were a distillation of
broader ideas already contained in the Uribe Uribe/de Grei￿’s project. After V￿ elez’s
project was easily approved in the Senate, the Conservative majority in Congress intro-
duced heavy modi￿cations to it, further weakening controls against fraud. Moreover, it
returned the modi￿ed project for ￿nal approval to the Senate only a few days before the
end of the annual sessions, virtually making a take-it-or-leave-it o￿er to Liberal senators.
Senator Lozano, the co-author of the 1915 project, complained: \There has been a series
53See separate declarations signed by the Liberal minority and the Conservative majority on November
8th (ACR 1915: 715-717).
54ACR 1916: 853.
31of projects [of electoral code] since 1913, but all failed mostly due to negligence or ob-
struction in the Congress. This year we have accepted the one sent by the State Council
[V￿ elez’s one], which was modi￿ed and polished by a commission headed by [Conservative]
Marceliano Arango. That is, we have accepted a project that was written and studied by
bodies in which Conservatives had the majority. But a group of Conservative represen-
tatives in Congress fought against it, directly or indirectly. For weeks did [the project]
sleep like a marmot. Later, they proposed modi￿cations that distorted the thinking of
the Senate, involving retrogression in the ￿eld of electoral legislation."55 Particularly dis-
turbing for Liberals was the discretionary power granted by the Congress’s modi￿cations
to local electoral supervisors. The Congress’s new project \allows electoral tribunals to
set voting places in veredas [secondary rural villages]. That is, the Conservative majority
is going to continue placing the voting places in the villages where Conservatives live and
will avoid villages where the houses of the Liberals are located. [...] In election time,
we will still have what is known as chocorazos in Magdalena, as canastadas in Boyac￿ a
and Cundinamarca, as and Milagros de Santa Isabel in Tolima [in italics, expressions for
the illegal addition of ballots in favor of the government]."56 Even Conservative senators
found the Congress’s modi￿cations questionable, but, as Pedro Molina argued, \there
is no time to insist on the Senate’s original project. We must not sacri￿ce the good in
search of the perfect."57 The Conservative criterion ￿nally prevailed, and V￿ elez’s modi￿ed
project became law on December 31st.
To recapitulate, both the 1910 amendment and the 1916 electoral code rati￿ed the in-
complete vote. However, whereas the 1910 reform was promoted by a bipartisan coalition
in a context of general conciliation between Conservatives and Liberals, the 1916 electoral
code was introduced in the midst of a revival of inter-party con￿ict. Con￿ict, however, was
not over electoral rules, but over fraud, which makes consensus over the incomplete vote
all the more remarkable. In fact, on November 25th, the Congress approved art. 112 of the




32package of tacitly agreed upon articles.58 Except for the brief exchange between de Grei￿
and the bi-partisan commission in the 1915 sessions of the Senate, the incomplete vote was
always taken for granted as the fundamental focus of the underlying bipartisan consen-
sus. The justi￿cation given by V￿ elez for the rati￿cation of the incomplete vote could have
very well been signed by any Liberal representative: \It is an undeniable fact, one that is
acknowledged by our political history, that most of our civil wars, which ￿ooded our soil
with blood, paralyzed progress and broke the bonds of peace, have originated in the lack
of properly representative Governments, in the systematic and hateful exclusion that was
installed in the Republic. Minority representation prevents revolutionary attempts."59
The fall of Reyes, the rise and disappearance of the Republican Union, and increasing
political tension over fraud|four rather disruptive phenomena, which nevertheless did
not threaten the incomplete vote at any moment, provided critical tests of the practically
unanimous level of consensus achieved in favor of minority representation in Colombian
politics.
5.6 Causes of war and consequences of reform
The historical events and processes reviewed above raise two questions for analysis. First,
how is it possible to assess whether it was power-monopolization, rather than other factors,
that was the cause of recurrent war in the second half of the 19th century, and power-
sharing the cause of peace during the ￿rst half of the 20th century? Second, why was the
incomplete vote chosen over other forms of power-sharing, like proportional representation,
bipartisan cabinets, fraud laws, or federalism? This section addresses the ￿rst question,
whereas the next one answers the second one.
War before 1905, as well as peace after then, were certainly multi-causal phenom-
ena. Historians and other social scientists have advanced both economic and political
explanations.60 Explanations, however, are usually meant to account for a single, dis-
58Due to renumbering, the article on the incomplete vote in the ￿nal version of law holds the number
111.
59V￿ elez, Bonifacio. Op. cit., 62-63.
60For explanation of the ￿rst kind, see Charles Berquist, Co￿ee and Con￿ict in Colombia, 1886-1910
(Durham: Duke University Press, 1978), and for explanation of the second type see Helen Delpar, Red
against Blue: the Liberal Party in Colombian politics, 1863-1899 (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama
33crete event, like the Thousand Days’ War, rather than the recurrent pattern of war,
rebellion and repression in the 19th century, or the subsequent period of peaceful power-
sharing|let alone the macroscopic transformation of the Colombian political arena from
chaos to order. Our explanation not only attempts to cover a big stretch of time, the
1850-1950 century, viewed as the juxtaposition of two broad political patterns, chaos and
order. More importantly, it also emphasizes political causes at the expense of economic
ones. However, in contrast to other political explanations, our argument is deliberately
speci￿c, for among the array of political factors that could be mentioned, it emphasizes
power-sharing via electoral rules, and a particular legislative reform, the introduction of
the incomplete vote in 1905. If pressed to argue by counterfactual reasoning, we would
advance twin claims:
1. Wars in general could have been prevented, and the Thousand Days’ War in partic-
ular could have been avoided, if the incomplete vote had been introduced in time.
2. Had the incomplete vote not been introduced in 1905, the pattern of interparty
warfare would have revived a few years later.
Case studies are methodologically weak strategies of causal inference. However, three
pieces of evidence provide support to the counterfactuals. First, at di￿erent points in
time before 1905, Conservatives tried di￿erent packages of concessions to the opposition,
but they never included the incomplete vote. In fact, except for electoral reform, by
1899 Sanclemente’s government had removed all other political grievances Liberals had
voiced, including the abolition of the Law of the Horses. Electoral reform was the only
persistent Liberal demand that was not met. This is the reason why we favor a political
explanation that is speci￿c about the cause. As a posterior con￿rmation of the motivations
driving Liberal rebellion, 1906 provides an instructive negative image of 1899: in 1899
Sanclemente put an end to extraordinary presidential powers but blocked electoral reform,
whereas in 1906 Reyes granted reform but assumed dictatorial faculties. Sanclemente
could not avoid civil war, whereas Reyes earned generalized Liberal applause. Evidence
Press, 1981).
34on the terms of the exchange between Reyes and the Liberal party abounds. Even Herrera,
who would eventually withdraw his support from Reyes’s administration, considered that
\after almost twenty ￿ve years of Conservative monopoly, Reyes allowed us to breathe, to
get back into public life, to become citizens again."61 A decade later, with the perspective
provided by the passage of time, Liberal Senator Fabio Lozano and the Conservative
coste~ no Manuel D￿ avila Florez engaged in a debate over a legislative project on \crimes
against the Nation" in the context of which the do ut des of Reyes and the Liberal party
was admitted with unusual political accuracy and candor. After Lozano attacked the
project on the grounds that it would favor tyranny, D￿ avila Florez noted: \but Colombian
Liberalism, your Honor, wholeheartedly supported General Reyes’s dictatorship." Lozano
quickly replied that \if your Honor wants, I am open to begin a dispute on this subject
because I will be able to prove that Liberalism did not commit any crime in supporting
that government. In order to neutralize any charges, it would be enough to consider that
the attitude [of support] was a response to the very special circumstance that Reyes began
his administration by o￿ering Liberals a piece of sun, political equality." D￿ avila Florez
would not miss the opportunity provided by his opponent’s confession: \But that theory
is shameful because it means that Liberalism accepts dictatorial governments in exchange
for participation in power."62
Second, whereas suspicion of fraud in presidential elections before 1905 was a quasi-
automatic prelude to rebellion and armed con￿ict, after the introduction of the incomplete
vote, Liberals’ satisfaction with their portion of power outweighed their discontent with
electoral manipulation by the Conservatives. In the 1922 presidential elections, fraud was
blatant.63 But, in contrast to the pre-1905 antecedents, rebellion did not follow. According
to our explanation, this was because Liberals had 1/3 of the institutional power: after
1905, war became an option in which they had much more to loose, and much less to win.
The third line of empirical support to the counterfactuals is contained in the testimony
61Jorge Orlando Melo, Op. cit. (1989): 217.
62AS 1916: 558.
63Isa￿ ￿as Chaves, Leopoldo Fergusson and James A. Robinson, \Ballot Stu￿ng: Theory and Evidence
from the 1922 Colombian Presidential Election" (Unpublished, Department of Government, Harvard
University, 2005).
35of the ￿nest political analysts of the time, including Julio H. Palacio, Pedro J. Navarro,
Luis Eduardo Nieto Caballero, and Hern￿ an Montoya. All these personalities are widely
recognized both for their political intelligence and their relative impartiality. For Palacio,
for instance, the blockage of the 1898 proposal by the Senate and Sanclemente, \was the
causa principal￿ ￿sma [‘most principal’ cause] of the devastating war."64 And vice-versa, \for
me, the true father of peace in Colombia, a fact that the nation still needs to acknowledge
and thank, is General Reyes, who facilitated minority representation. Without the dicta-
torship of Reyes, the peace treaties of Neerlandia and Wisconsin would have been dead
letter for a long time, and another war would have liquidated the country."65 Navarro,
in turn, con￿dently asserted that the incomplete vote was \the best law of Reyes’s dic-
tatorship: Colombia owes to it the internal peace that it has enjoyed for the last thirty
three years [sic, writing in 1935], the basis of its progress and material wellbeing." Navarro
added that peace had a second cause. \Even if it seems a paradox," peace was also caused
by \the civil war of 1899-1902, in which Liberalism proved that it was willing to make
any sacri￿ce in order to stop the violation of public liberties and citizenship rights."66 Of
course, Navarro’s two causes were sequentially connected: peace was caused by the law,
which in turn was caused by Liberalism’s potential threat of new \sacri￿ces."
Regarding the role of economic factors, our vision, if stylized, is the opposite of
Bergquist’s. For this author, as for Marxists in general, economic forces provide the
deep structure of the political process. Political decisions either re￿ect underlying eco-
nomic interests, or are the e￿ect of idiosyncratic and accidental factors. According to
this perspective, political decisions are not consequential: they can at most \trigger" an
outcome like a war, but those outcomes had nevertheless been determined beforehand
by underlying economic processes. In apparent support of Bergquist’s interpretation, the
Thousand Days’ War coincided with a ￿scal crisis and a sharp decline in co￿ee prices,
Colombia’s main export. And Liberals did complain about economic policy. From our
64Historia de mi vida (n/d): 249.
65Ibid.: 290.
66Pedro Juan Navarro. El Parlamento en Pijamas (Bogot￿ a: Talleres Mundo al D￿ ￿a, 1935): 15, 16.
For a similar appraisal by Nieto Caballero, see Escritos Escogidos (Bogot￿ a: Banco Popular, 1984), II:
266-267, and for Hern￿ an Montoya’s version, see La C￿ edula y el Sufragio (Bogot￿ a: Imprenta Nacional,
1938): 17.
36perspective, however, economic factors can actually be seen as only the \triggering event"
that unleashed a deeper political con￿ict around the historical exclusion of the opposition.
As observers and participants of the events made clear, the ￿scal crisis was endogenous to
the political con￿ict over power sharing. Mart￿ ￿nez Silva, Samper, and other participants
aware of the \political economy" of La Regeneraci￿ on, pointed out that most government
spending was allocated to military contention and repression of the Liberals.67 Economic
turmoil was actually a symptom of the impact of political con￿ict on the growing ￿scal
crisis, and the associated monetary expansion of the 1890s. Finally, Liberals’ complaints
against La Regeneraci￿ on’s monetary and ￿scal policies can be seen as an opportunistic
move to earn support from social sectors hurt by in￿ation, not the re￿ection of oppos-
ing economic interests (which Helen Delpar proved were not so di￿erent across political
parties). Ultimately, the target of Liberalism was a share of institutional power.
5.7 The Incomplete vote and Credible Power-sharing
Why did Conservatives and Liberals agree on the incomplete vote as the main mecha-
nism to share power? Other options of power sharing included laws against fraud, which
would have enabled Liberals to get seats from districts that were their electoral bastions,
or proportional representation, which could have also facilitated Liberal representation in
Congress. Neither alternative, however, was a viable solution that would appease Liberals.
Laws against fraud would not be viewed by Liberals as a real concession. \Changes in the
law are useless unless customs change," Historical Conservative Mart￿ ￿nez Silva observed
in the midst of one of the recurrent debates on electoral corruption.68 He was expressing
the opinion of a well-established current of thought, on which many Liberals and Con-
servatives converged, that blamed bad political habits or what was euphemistically called
\lack of civic education." Perhaps more important, the key perpetrators of electoral fraud
were local politicians, known as caciques and gamonales, in relation to whom national
politicians had little or only intermittent control.69 The 1904 incident of electoral cor-
67Mart￿ ￿nez Silva, Op. cit.: 467-68, 500-501. See also ACR 1898: 387.
68Revistas Pol￿ ￿ticas Publicadas en el Repertorio (Bogot￿ a: Imprenta Nacional, 1934), II: 434.
69Malcolm Deas, \Algunas notas sobre la historia del caciquismo en Colombia", in Del Poder y la
Gram￿ atica (Bogot￿ a: Tercer Mundo Editores, 1993): 218-219 (￿rst published in Revista de Occidente,
37ruption known as the Registro de Padilla, in which Conservative cacique from Guajira
Juanito Iguar￿ an persuaded other local authorities to sign a blank sheet so that he could
￿ll in the \o￿cial" electoral results for the presidential election in his district, is only the
most prominent one from a universe that probably included hundreds of cases. Either
because of deep-rooted habits or the autonomy of electoral brokers at the municipal level,
top leaders in the Conservative Party lacked the political resources needed to provide a
formal solution to fraud that Liberals could ￿nd realistic.
Precisely because of fraud, proportional representation was not a viable formula for
power sharing either. Faced with di￿erent options for electoral rules, Liberals probably
feared that, with the problem of fraud still open, the installation of proportional repre-
sentation would incite caciques to redouble their e￿orts at adulterating electoral results in
order to minimize the presence of Liberals in the legislatures. In fact, in public discussions
of alternative electoral rules during the Conservative Republic, a reason recurrently men-
tioned against proportional representation was \poor political culture," which sometimes
meant that proportional representation required calculations that were too complex for
the public, but more often it had the euphemistic sense of electoral corruption.70 In con-
trast to proportional representation, the incomplete vote is a \fraud-proof" formula. So
long as the Liberal opposition obtained at least one vote, it would get 33% of the seats.
The comparative advantage of the incomplete vote over proportional representation as
a mechanism of power sharing in a context of moderate to high electoral corruption is
what led Conservatives and Liberals to include the incomplete vote in the constitutional
amendments of 1905 and 1910, as well as in the electoral code of 1916.
5.8 The e￿ects of the Incomplete Vote
Redistribution of institutional power in favor of the Liberal party was the obvious proxi-
mate e￿ect of the incomplete vote. However, political order, the deep e￿ect, was the most
important one. The Conservative party traded a portion of power in Congress in exchange
for Liberal surrender of rebellious strategies. The new seats in Congress in turn gave Lib-
127, Madrid, 1973.)
70Evidence on this kind of argument will be reviewed below.
38eralism some in￿uence in policy decisions. A prominent mechanism of Liberal in￿uence
in law-making relied upon divisions within the Conservative party, which compelled rival
factions to compete for the support of the Liberal block, and extend concessions to their
leaders.
The incomplete vote, however, had one negative, albeit transitory, e￿ect for Liber-
als. Without violating the new electoral law, various local Conservative groups found a
subterfuge to leave Liberals in their districts with no representation. The Conservative
stratagem consisted in presenting two allegedly di￿erent lists and then coordinating the
votes of their supporters so that one Conservative list obtained the portion the seats cor-
responding to the majority (2/3), and the other Conservative list received the portion
corresponding to the minority. This phenomenon, known as arrastre or listas corsarias,
was not unusual, but it never become so pervasive as to threaten the basic principle of
minority representation. In any case, the Law 13 of 1920, banned arrastre by specifying
that parties, not lists, had to be represented in Congress.
6 Towards Proportional Representation: Conserva-
tive Dissension and Threat from Below in the 1920s
The quotient rule, a standard form of proportional representation, was introduced in
Colombia in November 1929. The reform was the outcome of a long and uninterrupted
crusade by the Liberal party. Liberal support for proportional representation in the 1910s
was restricted to a few isolated voices. However, it grew stronger over the ￿rst half of
the 1920s, achieving perfect unanimity by 1925. Senator Luis de Grei￿, the pioneering
advocate of proportional representation in the early 1910s, was also the man responsible
for aligning fellow Liberals into a compact block behind the advocacy of the quotient rule.
From 1920 to 1929 Liberals submitted to the Senate and the Congress a dozen proposals
to introduce proportional representation. Cosmetic variations of the same institutional
innovation, the proposals re￿ected Liberals’ various attempts at convincing a critical mass
of Conservatives about the bene￿ts of the quotient rule. In the Conservative camp, its
representatives were uniformly opposed to innovation during the ￿rst half of the 1920s.
39In 1926-27, perhaps persuaded by the Liberal campaign, a number of them, still insu￿-
cient to force the reform, changed their mind and announced that they would accept the
elimination of the incomplete vote in favor of a more proportional electoral system. In
1928-29, the Conservative party divided itself into two groups, each of which promoted
a di￿erent presidential candidate for the 1930 elections. In return for Liberal support to
their candidate, Alfredo V￿ asquez Cobo, the Vasquista group provided the necessary votes
to pass the proposal of proportional representation|a transitory Conservative division
allowed the decade-long Liberal campaign to eventually reach its goal.
Why did Liberals want to replace the incomplete vote with the quotient rule? And
why did Conservatives resist reform? Liberals mounted a double attack against the in-
complete vote, criticizing it both as a barrier against the entry of third parties|for it
rewarded with seats only the winner and the runner-up|and as a distortion of the rela-
tive electoral power of Liberals and Conservatives|for the size of the rewards was ￿xed
irrespective of the number of votes obtained by each party. \The main defect of the in-
complete vote," de Grei￿ argued in support of his 1922 project, \is that it only recognizes
two parties, one of which receives 66 percent of the seats and the other 33 percent, even
if that proportion does not correspond to their electoral force."71 The barrier argument,
in contrast to the distortion argument, involved a major break in relation to the kind of
reasons that Liberals had traditionally advanced in order to promote electoral reform. In
defending the participation of third parties, for the ￿rst time in the history of electoral
reform Liberals favored an innovation that apparently had no bene￿ts for them in terms
of a bigger share of institutional power. According to Liberals, the third party to bene￿t
the most from the hypothetical introduction of proportional representation would be the
Socialists or another Left-wing force, which would subtract votes from Liberalism, not
from Conservatism. Why, then, would Liberals advocate so resolutely, and Conservative
resist so obstinately, the introduction of proportional representation? Three possibilities
exist. The ￿rst possibility is that Liberals exaggerated the vitality of third parties, be-
lieving more in the distortion argument against the incomplete vote than in the barrier
argument. In this case, Liberals might have actually favored proportional representation
71AS 1922: 203.
40because they expected that the number of seats they would gain by removing the 1/3
ceiling imposed by the incomplete vote would be larger than the number of seats lost due
to the division of the opposition between a Liberal and a Socialist party. On the other
hand, Liberals might have genuinely believed that a Socialist party would emerge as a
signi￿cant political force. In that case, they might have favored the quotient rule either
because they viewed it as a mechanism to secure a public good shared by both traditional
parties, like the prevention of a Socialist revolution (second possibility), or because they
thought they could extract some exclusive bene￿t from a three-party system, for instance,
the creation of a progressive Liberal-Socialist coalition that could force the government
to make public policies more compatible with Liberal preferences (third possibility). The
following three subsections explore, in turn, these possibilities.
6.1 Demanding more than 33%
If the quotient rule was to enlarge the Liberal share of institutional power, the reasons
why Liberals supported proportional representation and Conservatives opposed it would
be self-evident. Liberals never admitted in public they were looking for a larger number of
seats. Conservatives, in turn, insisted that, if they opposed proportional representation,
it was not out of fear of a reduction of their weight in the Legislatures|on the contrary,
they argued that it was to prevent more power falling into their own hands. In his
opposition to the proposal of proportional representation that Liberals had submitted
to the Congress in 1928, Conservative V￿ elez Calvo argued that \if the project becomes
law, Liberals are going to complain after elections; scandals will be a thousand times
bigger than they are today. It is obvious that in Nari~ no, in Antioquia, in Boyac￿ a, and
probably in Cundinamarca, in the Santanders, and in Huila, Liberalism will be reduced
to its minimal expression. Probably Conservative exuberance in those Departments will
not allow the opposition party to get any representatives, and we, Conservatives, do
not have any interest to come to this house and ￿ll it with 3/4 or 4/5 of the seats,
instead of the 2/3 we have had." Moreover, for V￿ elez Calvo, the quotient rule was a
threat to public order precisely because it would eliminate the bene￿ts that Liberals
derived from the incomplete vote: \we are sure that, faced with total defeat under the
41new system, Liberals will for months talk about persecution, fraud, and oppression by
the Conservatives. That will unsettle the country, with no bene￿ts for anyone."72 An
identical argument against proportional representation had been advanced by the report
of the Conservative members of the commission that examined, and rejected, de Grei￿’s
project in 1922. Signed by Senator Carlos Jaramillo Isaza, the report asked: \would it
be good for the Republic that in the Department of Nari~ no, for instance, by virtue of
the quotient rule, only members of one party [i.e., Conservatism] were elected? Is not
it healthier for the country that a third of the seats belongs to the minority, no matter
what the number of votes in its favor is?" For the report there were no doubts that the
quotient rule would yield a larger representation for the Conservatives in the Senate and
the Congress: \although this may seem an exaggeration to many, it has all the power
of an axiom."73 Even in October 1929, faced with the imminent approval of the quotient
rule, Conservative Representative Guillermo Salamanca insisted on its negative e￿ects for
Liberalism, and made a last minute attempt to \save" his traditional opponents from
the catastrophe: \if the quotient rule is approved, will Liberalism or any other Left-wing
party be able to obtain the seat they have today in Departments like Boyac￿ a? [...] We
conservatives have ful￿lled the duty of warning the Liberals about the danger that the
quotient rule has for their organization."74
6.2 PR as a Public Good
In the early 1920s, politicians of all persuasions recognized that the incomplete vote had
been the basis of social peace for the prior ￿fteen years. However, social change over that
same period made the incomplete vote obsolete as a mechanism of power-sharing|or so
Liberals argued. Sustained economic growth during the two decades after the Thousand
Days’ War had in e￿ect fostered urbanization, industrialization and the rise of a working
class that, if still small, acquired political salience by organizing strikes, unions, confed-
erations, and proto-parties, like the Socialist Party (whose ￿rst comprehensive program




42Liberals argued that sooner or later the incomplete vote, by marginalizing third parties,
would push Labor-based parties like the Socialists into revolutionary tactics, in the same
way that the majoritarian system had forced Liberals into civil war the previous century.
This argument was, in fact, the most recurrent one in Liberal vindications of the quotient
rule.
In the 1922 legislative debate around de Grei￿’s proposal, Senator G￿ omez argued that
\social peace is not only a￿ected by armed movements but mainly by an unfair law [i.e.,
the incomplete vote] that does not allow the representation of important currents of opin-
ion [...] Given that the current law assumes that a party di￿erent from the historical
ones does not exist, and given that such parties do exist, there are good reasons for many
of our citizens to feel deprived of their political rights and be dissatis￿ed with the existing
order."75 Two years later, in the introduction of his own proposal of electoral reform,
prominent Liberal Senator Galvis Galvis warned: \we have the obligation to prevent agi-
tation, turmoil, and sacri￿ces. New trends are emerging that will cause serious frustration
if not channeled properly by explicitly acknowledging their force and in￿uence."76 In pro-
viding arithmetical examples of how the quotient rule would work, Galvis Galvis’s tables
included the Socialist Party as if it had become a permanent element of Colombia’s party
system.77 The argument recurred in the sessions of the following year, when for the ￿rst
time the entire block of Liberal Senators signed a collective proposal on proportional rep-
resentation, as a signal of how intensely committed they were to electoral reform. \It is
imperative to modify the straitjacket imposed by the incomplete vote," declared the doc-
ument. Proportional representation would \allow political, economic, and social parties
to express themselves in their full force and induce them to work within the framework
of the rule of law for the preservation of peace. Public order needs [reform]."78 In 1927,
75ACR 1922: 473.
76AS 1924: 374.
77AS 1924: 374. It was Galvis Galvis, however, who was the pioneer in including Socialists in explana-
tory tables. His 1922 proposal, for instance, explained: \In a district with 14,000 voters, 10,000 of which
are Liberals, 2,200 Conservatives, and 1,800 Socialists, in which 5 representatives are going to be chosen,
under the incomplete vote, three would be Liberals and two Conservative; thus, 1,100 [Conservative]
voters had the same electoral power as 3,300 [Liberal] voters, at the same time that while 1,100 voters
can chose one representative, 1,800 cannot have any one." See AS 1922: 203.
78AS 1925: 145.
43Liberal Senators again followed the tactics of signing a collective proposal, which this
time was reinforced by a symmetric movement by the block of Liberal representatives in
Congress. According to its declaration of motives, proportional representation \provides
room for action to legions of Colombians who do not ￿t any more within old programs
and the traditional party organizations." The rise of new parties \must be used in favor of
the country. The current law [incomplete vote] is anachronistic and has already given to
us all the good things it can provide." The block of Senators did not miss the opportunity
to reiterate the catastrophic consequences that would follow if the Legislatures failed to
introduce the quotient rule. If the political \currents that live underground and press to
emerge to surface" do not receive participation in Congress, then \the Republic will last
as much as the discontented masses want it to."79 During the debate of the same proposal
in the Congress, Liberal Carlos Hern￿ andez traced the trajectory of Colombia’s electoral
systems: \With the old system of absolute majorities only one party had representation.
With the current system of the incomplete vote, two parties have representation. With
the quotient rule, in the future all trends with enough force will have the door open to
representation."80 He added that if the Congress did not provide new electoral rules, third
parties \will conquer the representation they have the right to either by the su￿rage or
by revolution. Tyranny or Revolution. These two extremes, which will be the death of
the republic, are the outcomes we, the two traditional and big parties, must avoid as
a common cause."81 In 1928, Representative Gabriel Turbay, one of the most brilliant
Liberal speakers and strategists, entered the debate only to provide new rhetoric for old
concepts. He argued that, back in the 1910s, \the incomplete vote involved a big victory
and progress, but it left the legacy of injustice, the abhorrent and arbitrary notion that
only two parties can live [...] The coexistence of the two big collectivities is what gave
birth to the system of repartimiento de prebendas [rent sharing], the inevitable outcome
of the iron circle of Colombian Parliamentarianism."82
Either as a dilatory maneuver or out of sincere conviction, a typical reaction by Con-
79AS 1927: 294.
80ACR 1927: 351.
81ACR 1927: 352, 353.
82ACR 1928: 378.
44servative leaders was to deny the existence or relevance of a third party, the raison d’etre
of the Liberal campaign in favor of proportional representation. When, during the 1922
sessions, Liberal Senator G￿ omez asserted that it was time that the two traditional par-
ties grant participation to Socialists, Conservative Jaramillo Isaza abruptly interrupted
him: \but those parties do not exist, your Honor." G￿ omez replied: \Oh, please, do not
shut your eyes in front of the evidence. Facts are not to be discussed, they can only
be commented on."83 More conciliatory and sophisticated, de Grei￿ conceded that only
two parties were relevant at that time, \but we do not legislate only for the present.
We also legislate for the future, and we have to make room to political groups that may
later on ￿nd stable bases. Perhaps Socialists will strengthen their organization; it is also
possible that a Labor Party is founded." Pushing the limits of imagination, de Grei￿ also
speculated that \it may as well occur that an extreme faction of the Conservative party,
reacting against the organization of the Socialists, forms a Fascist party."84
A second kind of Conservative reaction against proportional representation pointed
to the cultural backwardness of the milieu in which the new system was supposed to be
introduced. For instance, the Conservative members of the commission that examined de
Grei￿’s 1922 proposal argued that \to try to change the system in order to introduce a
new one, which is hard to understand for the vast majority of Colombians, only for the
sake of making an essay, is a danger for the Republic [...] We lack the necessary civic
education."85 More concrete was Conservative Senator Pulecio, who argued that in rural
villages only a few people could compute the votes using the quotient rule, because the
o￿cials in charge of voting places \are usually the head servants of the ranches [may-
ordomos de las haciendas], most of whom are illiterate." Without denying it, a Liberal
Senator noticed that \Mr. Pulecio has actually raised the most serious charge against
the policy of public education under the Conservative regime. To claim that in the mu-
nicipalities no one can solve a simple division is the most formidable accusation that one
83AS 1922: 526.
84AS 1922: 573. The same spirit of anticipation and prevention was incorporated in the very text of a
proposed law in the sessions of 1927 of the Senate. Article 1 of that project stated \In order to secure in a
systematic way the proportional representation of all parties that might acquire [que vayan adquiriendo]
political existence, elections will apply [...] the quotient rule." See AS 1927: 293.
85AS 1922: 412.
45can make against the generations educated by the Conservatives."86 With this second
reaction, Conservatives were advancing a diagnosis of Colombian society that was almost
the exact opposite of the one that motivated Liberals to advocate reform. For Liberals,
Colombian society, as re￿ected in economic development and the rise of new social groups,
had advanced too much for the preservation of the incomplete vote to be a safe option;
for Conservatives, society had advanced too little, as evidenced by the lack of cultural
preparation for minimally complex political methods, for the introduction of the quotient
rule not to risk instability.
6.3 PR as a Private Good
Faced with the rise of Labor-based parties, Liberals might have actually envisioned pro-
portional representation as a mechanism to advance or protect partisan interests rather
than as a public solution to potential political disorder. De Grei￿, for instance, thought
that the representation of Left-wing parties in the Legislatures could create an institu-
tional ally to join the Liberals in a movement for progressive reforms. In a dispute with an
ardent defender of the incomplete vote, de Grei￿ asked: \What fundamental innovation,
in the area of public instruction for instance, can be attempted with the famous 33% equi-
librium? Minorities have to restrict their focus to secondary laws: to vote laws on honors
and pensions, because all substantial reform crashes against the force of the resistance
imposed by the incomplete vote."87 If proportional representation became law, some of
the new Socialist seats would probably be obtained at the expense of the Liberal party,
but Liberals might nevertheless prefer reform if the aggregate weight of a Liberal-Socialist
coalition surpassed the 1/3 of seats that were allocated to them by the incomplete vote.
That is, Liberals could have been willing to trade a reduction of the party’s institutional
power for increased chances of policy reforms.
Liberals might have also hoped that proportional representation would divide the Con-
servative party. Conservative divisions would favor policy reforms by forcing Conservative
subgroups to compete for Liberal support in their preferred policy areas and hence to
86AS 1922: 574.
87AS 1922: 574.
46make concessions in other areas. Conservatives, not Liberals, acknowledged this potential
transformation of Colombia’s traditional two-party system. As Julio Eduardo Ram￿ ￿rez,
member of the Valencista group, noted only weeks before the proportional representation
became law in 1929, \[the quotient rule] is lethal for traditional parties, especially for the
Conservatives, which is an organized party and its force stems from its discipline. The
quotient formula opens the gate to all kinds of dissolvent forces and personal ambitions;
it brings anarchy into elections; it weakens the cohesion that must exist within political
groups, to the point that these|not too far in the future|may loose their own shape;
￿nally, it fosters indiscipline and dissidence, atomizing opinion, leaving it without leaders
and directors, essential factors in all parties."88
A ￿nal reason why the Liberals might have wanted to eliminate the incomplete vote
and replace it by proportional representation is that they feared that they would loose
their position as ￿rst minority at the hands of Labor-based parties. As Rokkan argued,
a majority party in decline wants to switch from majoritarian rule to proportional rep-
resentation before the opposition becomes government. Similarly, a minority party that
expects to be outcompeted by a new opposition force ￿ghts for the elimination of the
incomplete vote in order not to disappear from the political arena. Although no evidence
exists that Liberals held this expectation, some electoral results in the early 1920s were
clearly favorable to Left-wing parties. For example, in the 1921 elections in Medell￿ ￿n,
Liberals lost the minority seat to a third party for the ￿rst time since the implementation
of the incomplete vote.
Liberals had a variety of reasons to support proportional representation, public or
private|like the preservation of public order versus the search of a bigger portion of
power|defensive or aggressive|the protection of its own minority position versus the
quest for new coalitions capable of introducing progressive reforms. Naturally, not all
reasons had the same weight in the minds of Liberal representatives or were equally
prominent across legislative debates. For di￿erent Liberal politicians, at di￿erent points
in time, some of those reasons seemed more relevant than others. For instance, whereas
de Grei￿ in 1922 viewed proportional representation as a formula to improve his party’s
88ACR 1929: 479.
4733% quota, Turbay in 1928 thought that electoral reform would transform Colombia’s
party system to make it more compatible with the social cleavages of a mass society.
Despite variations over time and across individuals in terms of the underlying justi￿cation,
the aggregate result was the same throughout the 1920s: unanimous Liberal support to
proportional representation. Unfortunately for Liberalism, no matter how uniform and
strong their commitment to the quotient rule was, there was nothing they could do without
the approval of the Conservative majority, or a fraction of it.
6.4 The 1929 Juncture
The uni￿ed resistance of Conservatism against proportional representation broke down in
1929. A year before, the Conservative party had divided itself around the two candidacies
for the presidential election of 1930, those of Guillermo Valencia and Alfredo V￿ asquez
Cobo. Vasquistas joined Liberalism in favoring the elimination of the incomplete vote
and the introduction of a new electoral rule. In contrast to Liberalism’s multifaceted
justi￿cation of the quotient rule, however, Vasquistas’ motivation was straightforward:
they needed the votes of the Liberal party to secure the electoral victory of their own
candidate. In exchange, they o￿ered collaboration with a package of Liberal initiatives in
Congress, including centrally the quotient rule. Vociferous opponents of proportional rep-
resentation before 1927, like Jaramillo Isaza or Trujillo G￿ omez, suddenly became ardent
defenders of reform. Some, like Senator Guerrero, who not too many sessions before had
claimed that rural villages were too uneducated to understand proportional representa-
tion, and too poor to receive education, went as far as to allege a vast pedigree in favor of
reform: \I am an advocate of the quotient rule, and I have presented projects establishing
such principles since 1912."89 The true motivation of the Vasquistas was publicly known,
and Valencistas denounced it: \Our group will not risk, in return for short-term political
gains, the integrity of the Conservative doctrine it advocates."90 Valencismo’s opposi-
tion, however, was powerless against the numerical superiority of the so-called \pliers"
formed by the Liberal/Vasquista alliance. The original project was introduced by Liberal
89AS 1929: 486.
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48representative Guillermo Pe~ naranda Arendas, it was debated in the Congress between
mid-September and early October and in the Senate in late October, and it became law
on November 5th (Law 31).
To support their position in favor of proportional representation, Liberals and Vasquista
Conservatives resorted to the same kind of \public good" argument that Liberals had ad-
vanced so many times in former sessions: economic change in previous decades had encour-
aged the emergence of new social groups, and new social groups, if not granted political
representation, involve a threat of anti-democratic revolutionary movements. Naturally,
Liberals did not mention their ambitions for a greater share of power, and Vasquistas
omitted any reference to the electoral gains they expected to obtain from the alliance
with the opposition. The novelty in the context of the 1929 sessions, however, was that
Liberals and Vasquistas furnished the public good argument with a decidedly gloomy tone.
Their discourses took for granted that an institutional crisis was an imminent fact. In the
introduction to his project, for instance, Pe~ naranda Arenas asserted that \the problem
[of political representation] has never been as acute as it is today. It is urgent to stop
the discredit of the legislatures and the ￿nal ruin of republican institutions."91 Trujillo
G￿ omez, the Vasquista representative recently converted into the creed of proportional
representation, similarly diagnosed that Colombian democracy su￿ered a \lethal illness"
because \the voice of rural and industrial workers" and \the interests of professions and
trades" have not been \heard in this Parliament." The incomplete vote is a \system that
ignores the living forces from the suburbs, ranches, workshops, and factories," and for that
reason it is to be blamed for the \twilight of democracy," which, among other \disturbing
problems," includes \systematic abstention and popular fatigue with the electoral func-
tion." For Trujillo G￿ omez, proportional representation meant \the opportunity to stop
this disaster: tomorrow it will be too late."92 According to the opening statement in the
report of the commission that studied the project in the Senate, \democracy su￿ers a
regrettable bankruptcy due to the fact that the people have lost their faith in the elec-
toral system." Like Liberals and Vasquistas in Congress, the commission in the Senate
91ACR 1929: 9.
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49predicted that proportional representation would \restore the lost trust and return the
prestige to the Legislatures, reviving civic enthusiasm around electoral contests."93
Irrespective of whether advocates of proportional representation genuinely believed
Colombia’s democracy was about to break down, the tone in their statements clearly re-
￿ected the deep public impact of the ￿rst large-scale episode of class con￿ict in the country,
the Masacre de las Bananeras, which had occurred almost exactly one year before in the
fruit plantations of the Northern department of Magdalena. After a decade of political
tension and ideological activation led by the Socialist Party, in October 1928 local plan-
tation workers organized a strike against the United Fruit Company, the monopsonistic
producer in the Caribbean. The o￿cial response was open repression. An indeterminate
toll of deaths (seventy-￿ve seems to be the most authoritative estimate) was one of the
consequences of repression. The other consequence was the discredit of the Conservative
regime, an outcome partly fueled by the rising Liberal politician Jorge Eli￿ ecer Gait￿ an,
who unyieldingly attacked the government’s approach to the bananeras problem from the
￿oor of the Congress.
Two elements in the ￿nal version of the law provide a suggestive indication of the readi-
ness with which Vasquista Conservatives extended extra concessions to Liberals. These
elements make clear that, despite the rhetoric of crisis and catastrophe, Vasquistas’ main
concern was centered on the following presidential elections|and the purchase of Lib-
eral support for their candidate. First, the form of proportional representation approved
was not \pure" but \mixed:" a special clause in article no. 4 stated that under no cir-
cumstances could a party obtain more than 2/3 of the seats (even if its vote share was
larger than 66%). By accepting this mixed formula, Vasquistas agreed to an arrangement
that was bound to reduce Conservatism’s legislative power. Second, in the course of the
debate Vasquistas tolerated a surprising mico (monkey), which in Colombia’s political
culture refers to a piece of legislation that is inserted into the main project once it has
reached a critical threshold of support by the legislators, and is presented as a minor
modi￿cation to details of the law when it actually involves a major reform in areas that
are not strictly related to the original spirit of the main proposal. The Liberal mico in
93AS 1929: 815.
501929 was no other than the c￿ edula, the electoral identity card, which was surreptitiously
introduced by Garbiel Turbay in the session of October 8th. Testing the limits of what
Vasquistas were willing to concede, Turbay’s mico has been celebrated by the Liberal
party as one of the most skillful legislative moves under the Conservative Hegemony.
Like the incomplete vote in 1905, the introduction of proportional representation in
1929 was a concession by the Conservative government to the Liberal opposition. In
contrast to the 1905 reform, in return for which Conservatives secured political peace in
the long term, the 1929 reform was expected to provide a short-term political gain for a
faction of the party in power. Although di￿erent Liberals politicians favored proportional
representation for di￿erent reasons, Vasquista Conservatives had one motivation for the
approval of a new electoral reform, namely, to obtain Liberal support for the presiden-
tial candidacy of V￿ asquez Cobo. The electoral motivation, which the rival faction of the
party did not hesitate to condemn, was naturally hidden behind the rhetorical invocation
to higher goals, including the incorporation of the incipient working class into the insti-
tutional arena as a third party (a goal that some Liberals apparently did embrace). As a
measure of the price that Vasquista Conservatives were willing to pay for Liberal support
in the following presidential elections, they agreed not only to proportional representation
but also to the c￿ edula, a venerable demand by the opposition, and a legal ceiling on the
amount of seats that the government could get.
7 Conclusions
The transition from chaos to order in Colombia in the mid 1900s was driven by a change in
the institutional allocation of political power. After the Thousand Days’ War, Colombia’s
two parties agreed to share power by means of a new set of electoral rules. The incom-
plete vote, the cornerstone of the new electoral rules, was a strategic concession by the
Conservative government to the Liberal opposition. In exchange for permanent represen-
tation in the legislatures, Liberals abandoned military insurrection as a political strategy.
Transition to proportional representation was completed in 1929 with the introduction of
the quotient rule. The quotient rule was also a concession from the government. This new
51concession, however, was not driven by Liberalism’s potential military power but by the
institutional power it had accumulated since the ￿rst concession. The incomplete vote
provided Liberalism with political resources to press for more political resources. The
opportunity to seize new resources arrived when, in the eve of the presidential election of
1930, the Conservative party split, and rival factions started to bid for Liberal support.
Political peace was not at stake in 1929|at least, Liberals were too satis￿ed with the
status quo to challenge it.
Findings on the transition from majoritarian rule to proportional representation in
Colombia are relevant both for the study of electoral history in Colombian Historiography,
and the study of electoral institutions in Political Science.
Recent historiography has underscored the existence of what Eduardo Posada-Carb￿ o
has called an \electoral tradition" in Colombia, which can allegedly be traced back to
the independence period.94 According to this argument, Colombia’s electoral tradition
manifests itself in the energy that politicians of both parties have traditionally invested
in elections, including campaigns adapted to di￿erent audiences, the early appearance of
political newspapers, and in general a permanent interest in gaining the electoral favor of
an increasing number of sectors in society. For Posada-Carb￿ o, a key feature of Colombia’s
electoral tradition would be the competitive nature of electoral contests, that is, the fact
that in general election results were uncertain, that winners in some cases were decided
by close margins, and that a number of government-backed candidates actually lost the
race. Our research on the transition to proportional representation in Colombia shows
that elections were not the only arena in which politicians competed for political power.
The allocation of political power in Colombia was also decided in ongoing negotiations
about the rules that de￿ned how votes would translate into seats. Moreover, in the 1910s
and 1920s leaders of both parties invested extraordinary amounts of time and e￿ort in the
design and debate of the institutions governing elections. Throughout those two decades,
no other issue received more attention in the Congress or the Senate. Specialists in elec-
94Eduardo Posada-Carb￿ o, \Limits of power: elections under the conservative hegemony in Colombia,
1886-1930", in Hispanic American Historical Review, 1997, 77, 2: 245-280, and \La tradici￿ on electoral"
(manuscript, 2005).
52toral rules included not only second level politicians of both parties, but also top leaders
like Uribe Uribe, who drafted a proposal for the ￿rst systematic electoral code, Abad￿ ￿a
M￿ endez and Olaya Herrera, the intervention of whom was crucial for the approval of the
law eliminating the pirate lists in 1920, or Jos￿ e Vicente Concha, the author of a handbook
in constitutional law that contained the most up to date discussion of alternative electoral
rules. In the legislatures, debates around electoral rules reached peaks of sophistication
when, for example, Liberal de Grei￿ displayed complicated arithmetical computations to
illustrate how di￿erent combinations of electoral rules would work. The legislative debate
naturally extended into the media, but it also reached academia. Before 1930, at least
nineteen doctoral theses were written on the topic of proportional versus majoritarian
representation. Concha and Olaya Herrera were regular members in the committees of
that kind of dissertation. Hence, to complement and reinforce the recent argument about
Colombia’s electoral tradition, both elections and debates around the rules governing
elections were vibrant political arenas. And they both mattered for the distribution of
political power between Conservatives and Liberals.
Regarding the other element of the electoral tradition reviewed by Posada-Carb￿ o, the
competitive nature of elections, it is worth noting that, according to our research, the
transitions from order to chaos occurred in concomitance with the rise of a mechanism
that made electoral contests for legislative seats less competitive. In e￿ect, by de￿ning
beforehand a ￿xed portion of institutional power for each party, the incomplete vote
removed a key element of uncertainty inherent in most electoral contests. Throughout
the 1910s and 1920s, Conservatives and Liberals took for granted the two thirds/one third
division of the political pie. And, according to our argument, it was precisely that non-
competitive mechanism that made possible the primacy of civilized political interactions
over armed con￿ict. Elections became relevant in Colombia only when they lost their
competitive nature.
Our research on the transition from majoritarian rule to proportional representation
in Colombia can also be located within broader debates in Political Science on the origins
of di￿erent types of electoral rule. The Colombian case illustrates that Stein Rokkan’s
argument was right in that parties choose electoral rules to maximize their share of seats
53in Congress. However, our research also points to an important caveat: parties maximize
institutional power subject to the constraint that political order is preserved, which is done
by securing that the rival parties receive a share of political power su￿cient to dissuade
them from anti-system tactics. The incomplete vote is not the only form of power-sharing,
but it was especially suited for the Colombian case, which had eliminated federalism (and
hence the possibility that the opposition controlled subnational executives), and had a long
tradition of de-centralized electoral corruption (which reduced the viability of proportional
representation as a form of power sharing in the national legislatures).
The reform of 1929 introducing proportional representation illustrates a subtle point
about the considerations involved in the choice of electoral rules. There normally exists
an amount of institutional power, in this case, a number of seats in Congress, that is sub-
ject to \normal" political transactions. Those seats can be thought of as the arithmetical
di￿erence between, on the one hand, perfect proportional representation, under which the
portion of seats in Congress is identical to the electoral weight of each party, and, on the
other hand, the amount of seats needed to satisfy the \no-revolution constraint," that is,
the number of seats that just dissuades the opposition from adopting a belligerent strat-
egy. In other words, any seats that are conceded to the opposition in addition to those
that satisfy the no-revolution constraint, have to be understood not as part of the price
that the government is paying for peace, but as belonging to a regular political exchange,
potentially involving short-term electoral gains. Whereas the 1905 reform secured peace
for a 50-year period in Colombia, the 1929 reform was meant to achieve a much more
modest and partial goal, the victory of one Conservative faction in the 1930 presiden-
tial election (and, despite the price paid, none of the Conservative candidates won the
election).
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